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ABSTRACT
The paper discusses several issues related to how monetary policy should be conducted in an era
of price stability. Low inflation (with base drift in the price level) and price-level stability (without such base
drift) are compared, and a suitable loss function (corresponding to flexible inflation targeting) is discussed,
including the index and level for the inflation target. Three ways of maintaining price stability are examined,
namely (1) a commitment to a simple instrument rule, (2) “forecast targeting,” and (3) monetary targeting.
Both (1) and (3) are found to be inferior to forecast targeting in maintaining price stability. The benefits of
credibility (private inflation expectations coinciding with the inflation target) are discussed.  Credibility
improves the tradeoff between inflation variability, output-gap variability and instrument variability and
makes it easier for the central bank to meet is inflation target.  The threat of deflation and a liquidity trap
is examined. Transparent inflation targeting and a contingency plan with emergency measures, including a
coordinated fiscal and monetary expansion, are likely to avoid a liquidity trap, but also contribute to
escaping from one if already trapped.
Lars E.O. Svensson
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01 Introduction
For several decades, high in￿ation has been the main threat to monetary stability. During the
1990s, low and stable in￿ation has been achieved in many countries. This may be the start of
a new era of price stability. This paper discusses some issues related to how monetary policy
should be conducted in such an era.
Before we can talk about an era of price stability, we need to be clear on the de￿nition
of price stability. In section 2, I discuss two de￿nitions, low (and stable) in￿ation,w h i c hi m -
plies base drift in the price level, and price-level stability, which does not imply such a base
drift. Most current discussion and monetary-policy formulations involve the ￿rst de￿nition, low
in￿ation. Price-level stability has the advantage of reducing long-term price-level uncertainty,
which should be bene￿cial for long-term planning and investment decisions. According to con-
ventional wisdom, however, it has the drawback of increasing short-term variability of in￿ation
and output, and is therefore not to be recommended. I argue that this conventional wisdom is
ill-founded, and that the relative advantages of the two kinds of price stability is a rather open
issue warranting further study. Instead, in a decade or so, when central banks (hopefully) master
maintaining low and stable in￿ation, the time may be ripe for seriously considering price-level
stability as a goal for monetary policy. Accumulated experience and research may then allow a
more reliable evaluation of the relative advantages of the two regimes. The rest of the paper is
mainly concerned with low in￿ation, although some of the discussion also applies to price-level
stability. The rest of section 2 discusses the choice of suitable objectives for monetary policy.
This boils down to specifying a loss function corresponding to ￿￿exible in￿ation targeting,￿ that
is, stabilizing in￿ation around an in￿ation target, but also putting some weight on stabilizing
the real economy, by stabilizing the real output around potential output. I also brie￿y discuss
the choice of a suitable index and target level for in￿ation.
An era of price stability will obviously only arise if central banks succeed in maintaining price
stability. In section 3, I discuss how central banks can best maintain price stability. I discuss
three alternative ways: (1) a commitment to a simple ￿instrument rule,￿ a rule for setting the
instrument, like the Taylor [110] rule for the Federal funds rate or the Meltzer [80] and McCallum
[77] rules for the monetary base; (2) ￿forecast targeting,￿ setting the instrument such that the
central bank￿s conditional forecasts for in￿ation and the output gap approach the in￿ation
target and zero, respectively; and (3) ￿monetary targeting,￿ where the instrument is set such as
to achieve a target growth rate for a broad monetary aggregate, like M2 or M3. Although simple
1instrument rules prominently ￿gure in current research and policy discussions, and the research
on simple instrument rules has contributed important insights, a commitment to these rules
seems neither a desirable nor a practical way of maintaining price stability. Furthermore, in line
with most previous research, monetary targeting appears to be an inferior way of maintaining
price stability. Instead, forecast targeting, which is indeed already practiced by successful central
banks, seems to be the most e¢cient way of maintaining price stability.1
An era of price stability will not only bring low and stable in￿ation but also low and stable
in￿ation expectations, that is, credibility for a low-in￿ation policy. Central bankers often seem
obsessed with credibility. In section 4, I argue that there are good reasons for this and discuss
the bene￿ts of credibility (in the sense of private in￿ation expectations anchored on the in￿ation
target). I show that credibility makes the tradeo⁄ between in￿ation variability, output-gap
variability and instrument variability more favorable, and that it puts the economy increasingly
on automatic pilot, such that less control and activism need to be exercised by the central
bank. These circumstances make it easier for the central bank to meet is targets. Furthermore,
credibility helps avoid de￿ation and a liquidity trap, the topic of the next section.
Current in￿ation is lower than in many decades, which, together with the situation in Japan,
has brought the potential threat of sustained de￿ation and a liquidity trap into focus. In section
5, I discuss the threat of de￿ation and a liquidity trap. More precisely, I specify what a liquidity
trap is and discuss how it is avoided, and how to get out of it, if already trapped. A liquidity
trap is a situation with zero nominal interest rates and persistent de￿ation and de￿ationary
expectations. Since money and nominal bonds are then perfect substitutes, monetary policy
becomes ine⁄ective and has no e⁄ects on nominal and real prices and quantities. Transparent
in￿ation targeting of an announced moderately positive in￿ation target seems to be the best
way of avoiding a liquidity trap. It also seems advantageous for central banks to make advance
contingency plans for emergency measures to be used if a series of unfortunate shocks were to
push the economy close to, or into, a liquidity trap. These measures would include increasingly
aggressive and unorthodox open-market operations, as well as preparations for coordinated
￿scal and monetary expansions. These measures are also likely to serve a role in escaping from
a liquidity trap, if already trapped. Since monetary policy may be ine⁄ective on its own, ￿scal
policy, both with regard to a ￿scal expansion and to nominal public debt management, is likely
to have an important role in escaping from a liquidity trap.
1 Sections 2 and 3 cover material that has previously been discussed in more detail in Svensson [107].
2Section 6 presents some conclusions. Appendices A and B present some technical details on
in￿ation variability under in￿ation targeting and price-level targeting (related to section 2.1)
and on monetary and ￿scal policy in a liquidity trap (related to section 5).
2 De￿ning price stability2
Before we can talk about an era of price stability, we need to be clear on how to de￿ne ￿price
stability￿. In this section, I discuss this de￿nition, in particular the distinction between price-
level stability and low in￿ation. I also discuss how to formulate the appropriate loss function
for a policy aiming at price stability, including any concern for stability of the real economy, as
well as the choice of price index and target level.
2.1 Price-level stability vs. low in￿ation
What is the appropriate de￿nition of ￿price stability￿? The most obvious meaning of price sta-
bility would seem to be a stable price level, ￿price-level stability.￿ Nevertheless, in most current
discussions and formulations of monetary policy, price stability instead means a situation with
low and stable in￿ation, ￿low in￿ation￿ (including zero in￿ation). The former de￿nition implies
that the price level is stationary (or at least trend-stationary, stationary around a deterministic
trend). The latter de￿nition implies base drift in the price level, so that the price level will
include a unit root and be non-(trend-)stationary. Indeed, the price-level variance increases
without bound with the forecast horizon. Thus, referring to low in￿ation as price stability is
indeed something of a misnomer.
Let me refer to a monetary-policy regime as price-level targeting or in￿ation targeting, de-
pending on whether the goal is a stable price level or a low and stable in￿ation rate. Note
that, if arguments in favor of a small positive in￿ation rate are accepted, an upward-sloping
price-level target path may be preferable to a constant price-level target, and still achieve the
desired trend-stationarity.
In the real world, there are currently an increasing number of monetary-policy regimes with
explicit or implicit in￿ation targeting, but no regimes with explicit or implicit price-level target-
ing. Whereas the Gold Standard may be interpreted as implying implicit price-level targeting,
so far the only regime in history with explicit price-level targeting occurred in Sweden during
2 This section covers material previously discussed in Svensson [107, section 2].
3the 1930s (see Fisher [42] and Berg and Jonung [9]; this regime was quite successful in avoiding
de￿ation).
Even if there are no current examples of price-level targeting regimes, price-level targeting
has been subject to an increasing interest in the monetary policy literature.3 A frequent result,
which has emerged as the conventional wisdom, is that the choice between price-level targeting
and in￿ation targeting involves a trade-o⁄ between low-frequency price-level variability on the
one hand and high-frequency in￿ation and output variability on the other. Thus, price-level
targeting has the advantage of a reduced long-term variability of the price level, which should
be bene￿cial for long-term nominal contracts and intertemporal decisions, but would come at the
cost of increased short-term variability of in￿ation and output. The intuition is straightforward:
In order to stabilize the price level under price-level targeting, higher-than-average in￿ation
must be succeeded by lower-than-average in￿ation. This would seem to result in higher in￿ation
variability than under in￿ation targeting, since base drift is accepted in the latter case and higher-
than-average in￿ation need only be succeeded by average in￿ation. Via nominal rigidities, the
higher in￿ation variability would then seem to result in higher output variability.4
However, this intuition may be misleadingly simple. In more realistic models of in￿ation
targeting and price-level targeting with more complicated dynamics, the relative variability of
in￿ation in the two regimes becomes an open issue. As shown in appendix A (which reproduces
some results in the appendix of the working-paper version of Svensson [106]), this is the case if
there is serial correlation in the deviation between the target variable and the target level; for
instance, if the price level displays mean reversion towards the price-level target under price-
level targeting and in￿ation displays mean reversion towards the in￿ation target under in￿ation
targeting. Svensson [106] and Vestin [118] give examples where the absence of a commitment
mechanism implies that the tradeo⁄ between in￿ation variability and output variability becomes
more favorable under price-level targeting than under in￿ation targeting.5 For some empirical
macro models (both small and large), reaction functions with responses of the instrument to
price-level deviations from a price-level target lead to as good or better overall performance (in
3 At the Jackson Hole Symposium 1984, Hall [52] argued for price-level targeting. Several recent papers
compare in￿ation targeting and price-level targeting, some of which are collected in Bank of Canada [5]; see
also Dugay [31]. Some papers compare in￿ation and price-level targeting by simulating the e⁄ect of postulated
reaction functions. Other papers compare the properties of postulated simple stochastic processes for in￿ation
and the price level (see Fischer [40]).
4 An interesting issue is the extent to which the degree of nominal rigidity depends on whether there is in￿ation
or price-level targeting.
5 With a Lucas-type Phillips curve, the more favorable tradeo⁄ under price-level targeting requires at least
moderate output persistence. With a forward-looking Calvo-type Phillips curve, preliminary results in Vestin [118]
indicate that the more favorable tradeo⁄ always occurs under price-level targeting, also without such persistence.
4terms of in￿ation and output variances) than with responses to in￿ation deviation from in￿ation
targets.6 Interestingly, a price-level target may have special advantages relative to an in￿ation
target in avoiding persistent de￿ation, since an unanticipated de￿ation that makes the price
level fall below the price-level target will, if the price-level target is credible, result in increased
in￿ation expectations. These increased in￿ation expectations will, by themselves, reduce the real
interest rate and stabilize the economy, even if the nominal interest rate remains unchanged.7
I believe these results to show that the relative properties of price-level targeting and in￿ation
targeting are far from settled. In particular, the potential bene￿ts from reduced long-term price-
level variability and uncertainty are not yet well understood. Still, low and stable in￿ation may
be a su¢ciently ambitious undertaking for central banks at present. However, once central banks
have mastered in￿ation targeting, in perhaps another decade, it may be time to increase the
ambitions and seriously consider price-level targeting. By then, research and experience may
provide better guidance about which regime is preferable.8
The rest of the paper will refer to ￿low in￿ation,￿ which allows base drift in the price level,
rather than ￿price-level stability,￿ which does not allow such base drift. Reluctantly, I will
occasionally refer to ￿low in￿ation￿ as ￿price stability,￿ even without using quotation marks.
Some of the discussion below is applicable to both price-level stability and low in￿ation, though.
2.2 Specifying the loss function
What is the appropriate loss function for a central bank aiming at low in￿ation? As substan-
tiated below, there is considerable agreement among academics and central bankers that the
appropriate loss function both involves stabilizing in￿ation around an in￿ation target and stabi-
lizing the real economy, represented by the output gap. This can be represented by a quadratic
6 See, for instance, McCallum and Nelson [79] and Williams [124].
7 Moreover, Wolman [126] ￿nds that a reaction function responding to price-level deviations from a price-level
target (rather than in￿ation deviation from an in￿ation target) has good properties for low in￿ation rates.




t (where …t · pt¡pt¡1 denotes in￿ation,
pt denotes the log of the price level, in￿ation, and p
⁄
t · pt¡1 + …
⁄), in￿ation targeting with a constant in￿ation
target …
⁄ is equivalent to price-level targeting with a state-contingent price level target p
⁄
t.F u r t h e r m o r e , s i n c e
p t¡ ^ p t· ( p t¡ p t ¡ 1 ) ¡ (^ pt ¡pt¡1) · …t ¡ ^ …t (where ^ pt is a deterministic price level target, for instance, a price
level path given by ^ pt =^ p t ¡ 1+…
⁄ ,a n d^ … t·^ p t¡p t ¡ 1 ), price-level targeting is equivalent to in￿ation targeting
with a state-contingent in￿ation target ^ …t.
Mervyn King￿s paper in this volume, [66], considers an interesting compromise between in￿ation targeting and
price-level targeting that aims at bringing the price level back to the price-level target at a horizon H.S i m p l e
algebra shows that this is equivalent to having a state-contingent in￿ation target, „ …t, that is, an average of the
constant in￿ation target under in￿ation target and the state-contingent in￿ation target under price-level targeting,
„ …t · (1 ¡ ￿)…
⁄ + ￿^ …t,w h e r e￿·1 = ( H+1 ) . It is also equivalent to having a price-level target, „ pt,t h a ti sa n
average of the corresponding price level targets, „ pt · (1 ¡ ￿)p
⁄
t + ￿^ pt, a case examined in Batini and Yates [8].
King shows that a relatively long horizon H, reduces long-term price-level uncertainty without much e⁄ect on






[(…t ¡ …⁄)2 + ‚(yt ¡ y⁄
t)2]; (2.1)
where the subscript t refers to the period, …t is an index of in￿ation, …⁄ is an in￿ation target,
yt is (log) output, y⁄
t is potential output (so that yt ¡ y⁄
t is the output gap), and ‚>0is the
relative weight on output-gap stabilization.9 As in Svensson [103] and [105], I ￿nd it practical to
refer to this loss function with ‚>0(or concern about stability of the real economy in general)
as ￿exible in￿ation targeting, and ‚ =0as strict in￿ation targeting.10
Since current in￿ation and output are, in practice, predetermined, current monetary-policy
actions can only a⁄ect future in￿ation and output. Furthermore, in￿ation, output and, in
particular, potential output are observed (or estimated) with measurement errors. Then, the






where Et denotes expectations conditional on the central bank￿s information in period t and –
(0 <–<1 ) is a discount factor.
Whereas there may previously have been some controversy about whether in￿ation targeting
involves concern about real variability, represented by output-gap variability and corresponding
to the second term in (2.1), there is now considerable agreement in the literature that this is
indeed the case: In￿ation-targeting central banks are not what King [67] referred to as ￿in￿a-
tion nutters.￿11 As shown by Ball [2] and Svensson [97], concern about output-gap stability
translates into a more gradualist policy (at least in standard simple models of the transmis-
sion mechanism). Thus, if in￿ation moves away from the in￿ation target, it is more gradually
brought back to target. Equivalently, in￿ation-targeting central banks lengthen their horizon
and aim at meeting the in￿ation target further in the future. In contrast, strict in￿ation tar-
geting would involve meeting the in￿ation target at the shortest possible horizon and thereby
9 Rotemberg and Woodford [91], Woodford [128] and Erceg, Henderson and Levin [33] show how a quadratic
loss function like (2.1) can be derived as a second-order Taylor approximation of the welfare of a representative
consumer.
10 As in￿ation-targeting central banks, like other central banks, also seem to smooth instruments, the loss
function (2.1) may also include the term „(it ¡ it¡1)
2 with „>0 . Sack and Wieland [94] provide a survey of
recent work and evidence on interest-rate smoothing.
Woodford [129] shows that, under the case of discretion (see the discussion in section 3.1 below), some weight
on interest-rate smoothing is advantageous, since it induces some of the inertia in interest-rate setting that is
optimal but otherwise only results under commitment.
11 For instance, Fischer [41], King [65], Taylor [112] and Svensson [96] in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
[37] all discuss in￿ation targeting with reference to a loss function of the form (2.1) with ‚>0 .
6generate considerable output-gap volatility.12 A sf u r t h e rd i s c u s s e di nS v e n s s o n[ 1 0 3 ] ,c o n c e r n s
about output-gap stability, simple forms of model uncertainty, and interest rate smoothing all
have similar e⁄ects under in￿ation targeting, namely a more gradualist policy. Sveriges Riksbank
has expressed similar views.13 The Chancellor￿s remit to Bank of England [58] mentions ￿unde-
s i r e dv o l a t i l i t yo fo u t p u t . ￿ 14 The Minutes from Bank of England￿s Monetary Policy Committee
[6] are also explicit about stabilizing the output gap.15 Several contributions and discussions
by central bankers and academics in Lowe [76] express similar views. Ball [3] and Svensson [99]
give examples of the gradualist approach of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Indeed, a quote
from the ECB [35, p. 47] also gives some support for an interpretation with ‚>0(as well as
some weight on minimizing interest rate variability):
... a medium-term orientation of monetary policy is important in order to permit a
gradualist and measured response [to some threats to price stability]. Such a central
bank response will not introduce unnecessary and possibly self-sustaining uncertainty
into short-term interest rates or the real economy...
Thus, it is seems noncontroversial that real-world in￿ation targeting is actually ￿exible in-
￿ation targeting with some concern for variability in the real economy, corresponding to ‚>0
in (2.1). Furthermore, as discussed in some detail in Svensson [102], there is general agreement
that the output target under in￿ation target should equal potential output, so as to avoid any
average in￿ation bias.16
2.3 What index and which level?
Which price index would be most appropriate? Stabilizing the CPI, interpreted as a cost-of-
living index for the average consumer, should simplify the consumers￿ economic calculations and
12 This discussion takes it for granted that there exists a genuine tradeo⁄ between in￿ation variability and
output-gap variability. This tradeo⁄ is disputed in Goodfriend and King [48], Ireland [59], and Rotemberg and
Woodford [91]. See Clarida, Gali and Gertler [26] and Erceg, Henderson and Levin [33] for further discussion of
this controversy.
13 See Sveriges Riksbank [109, box on p. 26], as well as Heikensten and Vredin [55].
14 ￿...actual in￿ation will on occasions depart from its target as a result of shocks and disturbances. Attempts
to keep in￿ation at the in￿ation target in these circumstances may cause undesirable volatility in output.￿
15 See Bank of England [6], para. 40: ￿... [I]n any given circumstances, a variety of di⁄erent interest rate paths
could in principle achieve the in￿ation target. What factors were relevant to the preferred pro￿le of rates?...
There was a broad consensus that the Committee should in principle be concerned about deviations of the level
of output from capacity.￿
Incidentally, this shows that just specifying a long horizon, T, for the in￿ation target without concern about
real variability, Lt =( … t + T¡…
⁄)
2= 2 ,w h e r e… t + T is either 4-quarter in￿ation in period t + T or a longer moving
average of in￿ation, is not su¢cient, since there may be multiple paths for the economy minimizing that loss
function.
16 The loss function (2.1) highlights an asymmetry between in￿ation and output under in￿ation targeting.
There is both a level goal and a stability goal for in￿ation, and the level goal, that is, the in￿ation target, is
subject to choice. For output, there is only a stability goal and no level goal. Or, to put it di⁄erently, the level
goal is not subject to choice; it is given by potential output. Therefore, I believe it appropriate to label minimizing
(2.1) as ￿(￿exible) in￿ation targeting￿ rather than ￿in￿ation-and-output-gap targeting,￿ especially since the label
is already used for the monetary policy regimes in New Zealand, Canada, U.K., Sweden and Australia.
7decisions. The CPI also has the advantage of being easily understood, frequently published,
published by authorities separate from central banks, and very rarely revised. Interest-related
costs cause well-known problems with the CPI, though: An interest-rate increase to lower in-
￿ation has the perverse short-term e⁄ect of increasing in￿ation. This presents a pedagogical
problem in the central bank￿s communication with the general public. To avoid this problem,
Bank of England and Reserve Bank of New Zealand have in￿ation targets de￿ned in terms of
CPIX (RPIX in Britain), the CPI less interest-related costs.17 The Eurosystem has de￿ned price
stability in terms of the HICP, which also excludes interest costs. Furthermore, changes in indi-
rect taxes and subsidies can have considerable short-run e⁄ects on the CPI. Di⁄erent measures
of underlying in￿ation, core in￿ation, try to eliminate such e⁄ects. Eliminating components
over which monetary policy has little or no in￿uence serves to avoid misleading impressions of
the degree of control. The disadvantage of subtracting components from the CPI is that the
remaining index becomes more remote from what matters to consumers and less transparent to
the general public. It may also be di¢cult to compute in a well-de￿ned and transparent way.
Opinions generally di⁄er on what components to deduct from the CPI. My own view is that
deducting interest-related costs and using CPIX, together with transparent explanation of index
movements caused by changes in indirect taxes and subsidies, is an appropriate compromise for
making the index an operational target for monetary policy.
Critics of in￿ation targeting and proponents of monetary targeting sometimes criticize in￿a-
tion targeting for being concerned about short-run in￿ation and temporary changes in in￿ation,
and argue that monetary targeting would indirectly imply targeting permanent components of
in￿ation only.18 It seems that this issue is much better confronted by explicitly selecting the
appropriate in￿ation index to be targeted. Indeed, as already noted above, di⁄erent measures of
underlying in￿ation (as suggested by the term itself) are explicitly designed to exclude tempo-
rary disturbances and focus on persistent components of in￿ation. Furthermore, the practice of
measuring in￿ation as 12-month moving-average in￿ation rates is, by itself, a way of averaging
out some of the wider and more transitory movements in in￿ation. Finally, forecasts of in￿ation,
in practice, focus more on persistent changes in in￿ation and less on transient ones, since the
former are, by nature, easier to predict.19
17 The Reserve Bank￿s target was previously de￿ned in terms of a somewhat complex underlying in￿ation rate.
In the Policy Target Agreement of December 1997, there was a change to the more transparent CPIX .
18 See Issing [60], Meltzer [81] and von Hagen [120].
19 If there were evidence that money growth is the best predictor of a reasonable index of underlying in￿ation,
proponents of monetary targeting would have a case. I am aware of no such evidence. See section 3.3 for further
discussion of monetary targeting.
8What level of the in￿ation target is appropriate? Although zero in￿ation would seem to
be a natural focal point, all countries with in￿ation targets have selected positive in￿ation
targets. The in￿ation targets (point targets or midpoints of the target range) vary between 1.5
percent (per year) in New Zealand, 2 percent in Canada, Sweden and Finland (before Finland
joined the EMU), and 2.5 percent in the United Kingdom and Australia (the Reserve Bank of
Australia has a target range of 2￿3 percent for average in￿ation over an unspeci￿ed business
cycle). The Bundesbank had a 2 percent in￿ation target for many years (called ￿unavoidable
in￿ation,￿ ￿price norm,￿ or ￿medium-term price assumption￿). During 1997 and 1998, it was
lowered to 1.5￿2 percent (which could perhaps be translated into a point in￿ation target of 1.75
percent). The Eurosystem has announced ￿annual increases in the HICP below 2 percent￿ as its
de￿nition of price stability, which has been interpreted as the ranges 0￿2 percent or 1￿2 percent;
t h eE u r o s y s t e ma p p e a r e dt oh a v eu s e dap o i n ti n ￿ a t i o nt a r g e to f1 . 5p e r c e n ti nc o n s t r u c t i n gi t s
reference value for money growth.20
That the in￿ation target exceeds zero can be motivated by measurement bias, nonnegative
nominal interest rates and possible downward nominal price and wage rigidities.21 Two percent is
the borderline in Akerlof, Dickens and Perry [1], who study the e⁄ects of the downward rigidity of
nominal wages. One percent is the borderline in Orphanides and Wieland [86], who examine the
consequences of non-negative nominal interest rates. These studies indicate that in￿ation targets
below those borderlines risk reducing average output or increasing average unemployment.22 23
Given these results, it may not be so important whether the in￿ation target (the midpoint of
the range) is 1.5, 2 or 2.5 percent.
A symmetric in￿ation target implies that in￿ation below the target is considered to be equally
bad as the same distance above the target (which is the case if in￿ation targeting is represented
by a symmetric loss function like (2.1)). An asymmetric in￿ation target may induce an upward
20 See Svensson [104] for a detailed discussion of alternative interpretations of the Eurosystem￿s de￿nition of
price stability.
21 On the other hand, the argument that in￿ation increases capital-market distortions, examined in Feldstein
[38] and [39], would, under the assumption of unchanged nominal taxation of capital, motivate a zero or even a
negative in￿ation target.
22 For reasons explained in Gordon [49], I believe that Akerlof, Dickens and Perry [1] reach too pessimistic
a conclusion. On the other hand, their data is from the United States and Canada, and downward nominal
wage rigidity may be more relevant in Europe. Holden [57] model mechanisms that may increase such rigidity in
Europe. The conclusions of Orphanides and Wieland [86] are sensitive to assumptions about the size of shocks
and the average real interest rate; the latter is taken to be 1 percent for the United States. If the average real rate
is higher in Europe, and the shocks not much larger than in the United States, nonnegative interest rates may be
of less consequence in Europe. Wolman [126] and [125] provides a rigorous examination of the consequences of
nonnegative interest rates in a more explicit model, and ￿nds relatively small e⁄ects.
23 Examining the e⁄ect of in￿ation on the U.S. labor market, Groshen and Schweitzer [51] ￿nd that ￿grease￿
and ￿sand￿ e⁄ects roughly cancel for low in￿ation rates, and that there is no justi￿cation for in￿ation targets
above 2.5 percent.
9or downward bias in in￿ation expectations. A point target with or without a tolerance interval
would, from this point of view, be better than just a range. As argued in section 4, there should
be substantial bene￿ts from in￿ation expectations stabilizing at the in￿ation target. A point
in￿ation target then gives a well-de￿ned focal point for in￿ation expectations that enter into
wage setting and other contracts. With a range of 0￿2 percent, for instance, there is a large
di⁄erence between in￿ation expectations stabilizing at 0 percent or 2 percent. Nevertheless, a
symmetric range would, in turn, be better than an asymmetric formulation like the Eurosystem￿s
￿below 2 percent.￿ As further discussed in section 5, these aspects may be particularly important
in order to avoid a liquidity trap with persistent de￿ation; a possibility that seems less remote
given recent developments in Japan. A symmetric and small positive in￿ation target would
seem to be the best defence against a liquidity trap with persistent de￿ation and de￿ationary
expectations.
3 Maintaining price stability24
An era of price stability will obviously not materialize unless central banks succeed in maintaining
price stability. The central bank then needs to minimize expected future discounted losses, (2.2),
consisting of a weighted sum of squared deviations of in￿ation from the in￿ation variables and
squared deviations of output from the output gap, (2.1). Then in￿ation and the output gap are
the central bank￿s target variables, that is, the variables entering the central bank￿s loss function.
The central bank￿s control variable, its instrument, is in practice a short interest rate, like the
federal funds rate in the U.S.25 The central bank￿s task is then to set its instrument so as to
best minimize the intertemporal loss function. To achieve this, the central bank must have a
view of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, that is, how the instrument and the
current state of the economy a⁄ect the future path of the target variables.
In this section, I will discuss the central bank￿s framework for policy decisions, the principles
for the setting of its instrument. I will discuss three alternative decision frameworks, or principles
for setting the instrument, namely commitment to a simple instrument rule in subsection 3.1,
forecast targeting in subsection 3.2, and monetary targeting in subsection 3.3.
24 Some of the material in this section is discussed more extensively in Svensson [107, section 3].
25 In a more detailed treatment, we can consider the (nonborrowed) monetary base as the true instrument (over
which the central bank has complete control), and the short interest rate as a so-called operating target (over
which it has almost complete control), but this degree of detail is not required here.
103.1 Commitment to a simple instrument rule
A large part of the monetary-policy literature uses the concept of ￿rules￿ in the narrow sense of a
prescribed reaction function for monetary policy. Instead, as in Svensson [102], I ￿nd it helpful
to use the concept of monetary-policy rules in a wider sense, namely as ￿a prescribed guide
for monetary policy.￿ This allows ￿instrument rules,￿ prescribed reaction functions, as well as
￿targeting rules,￿ prescribed loss functions or prescribed conditions for the target variables (or
forecasts of the target variables).26 27
Thus, in this subsection, I am concerned with instrument rules, that is, a rule prescribing
the central bank￿s instrument as a particular reaction function, that is, a particular function
of variables observable by the central bank. Suppose we make the unrealistic assumption that
the central bank can commit, once and for all, to a particular reaction function for all future
periods. Furthermore, assume that the central bank knows the transmission mechanism and the
current state of the economy. Under these assumptions it is, in principle, possible to ￿nd the
optimal reaction function that minimizes the central bank￿s intertemporal loss function, (2.2).
The optimal reaction function under commitment is a very complex construction and would
normally be a function of all the relevant variables that describe the state of the economy (as
well as lags of these variables).28 This is likely to be too complex to be veri￿able. For this and
other reasons discussed below, a commitment to the optimal reaction function is not realistic.
Consider instead the class of simple reaction functions, meaning reaction functions with few
arguments. A typical simple reaction function is the much discussed Taylor [110] rule,
it =„ r+… ⁄+1 : 5(…t ¡ …⁄)+0 : 5(yt ¡ y⁄
t);
where it is the federal funds rate and „ r is the average real interest rate.29 Under the assumptions
stated above it is, in principle, possible to ￿nd the optimal simple reaction function (under
commitment), the reaction function in a particular class of simple reaction functions minimizing
26 Target(ing) rules are discussed by Rogo⁄ [89], Walsh [122], Svensson [97] and [102], Cecchetti [23], Clarida,
Gali and Gertler [26], and Rudebusch and Svensson [92].
27 Furthermore, (as in Rogo⁄ [89], Walsh [122], Svensson [97], Cecchetti [23], Clarida, Gali and Gertler [26] and
Rudebusch and Svensson [92]) ￿targeting￿ here refers to loss functions and ￿target variables￿ refer to variables
in the loss function. Thus ￿targeting variable Yt￿ means minimizing a loss function that is increasing in the
deviation between the variable and a target level. In contrast, in some of the literature ￿targeting variable Yt￿
refers to a reaction function where the instrument responds to the same deviation. As discussed in Svensson [102,
section 2.4], these two meanings of ￿targeting variable Yt￿a r en o te q u i v a l e n t .￿ R e s p o n d i n gt ov a r i a b l eY t￿s e e m s
to be a more appropriate description of the latter situation.
28 In a linear model with predetermined and forward-looking variables, the optimal reaction function under
commitment is a linear function of the predetermined variables and the Lagrange multipliers of the forward-looking
variables. These multipliers can be expressed as a distributed lag of previous predetermined variables.
29 Wicksell [123] and Henderson and McKibbin [56] have suggested other simple reaction functions with the
interest rate as the instrument. Meltzer [80] and McCallum [77] have suggested simple reaction functions with
the monetary base as the instrument.
11the intertemporal loss function. A su¢ciently simple reaction function is easily veri￿ed. In
principle, we can thus conceive of a commitment to a simple reaction function, a commitment
t oas i m p l ei n s t r u m e n tr u l e .
We realize that, under a commitment to a simple instrument rule, the central bank need
no longer be forward-looking. It need only be forward-looking once and for all, when deciding
to which simple reaction function it will commit. After that, it can just set the instrument
mechanically according to the simple rule.30
Most of the current and previous discussion of monetary-policy rules is in terms of commit-
ment to alternative instrument rules (see, for instance, McCallum [78] and the contributions in
B r y a n t ,H o o p e ra n dM a n n[ 2 0 ]a n dT a y l o r[ 1 1 4 ] ) .T h er e s e a r c ho ni n s t r u m e n tr u l e sh a v ec o n -
tributed many important insights.31 Nevertheless, it seems that a commitment to an instrument
rule is not the best way of maintaining price stability, for several reasons.
First, there are considerable practical di¢culties in deciding, once and for all, which instru-
ment rule to follow. In general, Currie and Levine [29] have shown that the optimal simple
reaction function does not only depend on the model and the loss function but also on the
stochastic properties of the shocks and the initial state of the economy.32 This is a considerable
problem, since the model and the stochastic properties of the shocks are not exactly known (to
say the least). Still, it may be possible to ￿nd a simple reaction function that works tolerably
well in di⁄erent models. This idea is promoted and examined in several papers by McCallum
and recently restated in McCallum [78]. Results of Levin, Williams and Wieland [75] for a set
of models of the U.S. economy indicate that a simple reaction function may be relatively robust
in this sense. Still, in a class of reaction functions as restricted as Taylor-type reaction func-
tions with interest-rate smoothing (where the Federal funds rate depends on in￿ation only, the
output gap and the lagged Federal funds rate), there is considerable variation in the suggested
magnitudes for the three coe¢cients, as is apparent from the papers published in Taylor [114].
30 As discussed in Svensson [107], a commitment to a simple instrument rule can be interpreted as an ￿interest-
rate targeting￿ rule, where the central bank instead of (2.1) and (2.2) has a new static loss function given by
Lt =( i t¡i
⁄
t)
2= 2 ,w h e r ei
⁄
t is the interest rate prescribed by the simple instrument rule.
31 These insights include that stability of in￿ation requires the long-run response of the short interest rate to
increase more than one-to-one with in￿ation (see Taylor [113]), that interest-rate smoothing may be optimal (see
Rotemberg and Woodford [91] and [129]), that it is better that the instrument responds to the determinants of the
target variables than to the target variables themselves (for instance, even if in￿ation is the only target variable
(the only variable in the loss function), it is generally better to respond to both current in￿ation and the output
gap, since both these are determinants of future in￿ation; see for instance, Svensson [97] and [100]), and that
the response coe¢cients in the optimal reaction function depend on the weights in the loss function on di⁄erent
target variables in sometimes nonintuitive and complex ways (see, for instance, Svensson [97]).
32 Even if the model is linear and the loss function is quadratic, certainty-equivalence does not apply to the
optimal simple instrument rule.
12Second, a commitment to an instrument rule does not leave any room for judgemental ad-
justments and extra-model information. In practice, monetary policy cannot (at least not yet)
rely on models only. As further discussed in Svensson [107], the use of judgemental adjustments
and extra-model information is both desirable in principle and unavoidable in practice. Further-
more, a commitment leaves no room for revisions of the instrument rule, when new information
a n dr e s e a r c hr e s u l t si nr e v i s i o n so ft h em o d e l . F o rb o t ht h e s er e a s o n s ,ac o m m i t m e n tt oa n
instrument rule would be ine¢cient.
Third, although a commitment to a simple instrument rule seems technically feasible, such
a commitment is unheard of in the history of monetary policy, most likely for obvious reasons.
It would involve committing the decision-making body of the central bank to reacting in a
prescribed way to prescribed information. Monetary policy could be delegated to the sta⁄, or
even to a computer, and it would be completely static and mechanical and not forward-looking.
Such a degradation of the decision-making process would naturally be strongly resisted by any
central bank and, I believe, arguments about its ine¢ciency would also easily convince legislators
to reject it. In practice, there is therefore no commitment mechanism that commits the decision-
making body to reacting in a prescribed way to prescribed information. In real-world monetary
policy, decision-making under considerable discretion is more or less unavoidable. As Blinder [14,
p. 49] puts it, ￿Rarely does society solve a time-consistency problem by rigid precommitment...
Enlightened discretion is the rule￿.33 Instead, at best, the commitment is provided by the
objective of monetary policy.34
Thus, we are unlikely to ever see a commitment to a mechanical simple instrument rule
f o rm o n e t a r yp o l i c y . S i n c ea n yg i v e ni n s t r u m e n tr u l ei sl i k e l yt ob em o r eo rl e s si n e ¢ c i e n ti n
certain situations, there would be frequent incentives to deviate, often for very good reasons,
due to new, unforeseen, information (a crash of the stock-market, a crisis in Asia, the ￿oating
of the Brazilian real, etc.) and corresponding sound judgemental adjustments. Therefore, a
simple instrument rule is not incentive-compatible, and, in the absence of commitment, frequent
deviations would occur.35
33 As stated by King [66] in this volume, ￿Mechanical policy rules are not credible... No rule could be written
down that describes how policy would be set in all possible outcomes. Some discretion is inevitable. But that
discretion must be constrained by a clear objective to which policy is directed...￿
34 There is an additional philosophical objection to once-and-for-all commitment: How come that the once-
and-for-all commitment can be made in some particular period, t =0 , say? Why was it not already done before,
so that nothing remains to be committed to in period 0? Why is period 0 special?
35 In his commentary, Michael Woodford [127], suggests a very sophisticated kind of commitment, a continuous
recommitment in a ￿timeless perspective￿ to a simple instrument rule (although the particular example given,
strictly speaking, involves target variables (in￿ation and the output gap) rather than the instrument (the short
interest rate) and therefore, arguably, seems to involve a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule). The
13Thus, although alternative instrument rules can serve as informative guidelines (as empha-
s i z e di nT a y l o r[ 1 1 0 ] ) , 36 and decisions ex post may sometimes be similar to those prescribed by
the simple instrument rules, a rigid commitment to a simple instrument rule is not a realistic sub-
stitute for a forward-looking decision framework. Indeed, instead of making a forward-looking
decision once and for all only, at the time of a commitment to a simple instrument rule, a central
bank aiming at price stability needs to be continuously forward-looking and have a regular cycle
of decision-making. To quote Greenspan [50, p. 244],
Implicit in any monetary policy action or inaction, is an expectation of how the
future will unfold, that is, a forecast.
The belief that some formal set of rules for policy implementation can e⁄ectively
eliminate that problem is, in my judgement, an illusion. There is no way to avoid
making a forecast, explicitly or implicitly.37
Therefore, I now turn to an alternative way of maintaining price stability, namely by way of
￿forecast targeting.￿ This is arguably a more practical and realistic way of maintaining price
stability, and it is indeed already practiced. 38
3.2 Forecast targeting
Monetary policy a⁄ects the economy with considerable lags. Normally, current in￿ation and out-
put are, to a large extent, determined by previous decisions of ￿rms and households. Normally,
current monetary-policy actions can only a⁄ect the future levels of in￿ation and the output gap,
in practice with substantial lags and with the total e⁄ects spread out over several quarters. This
makes forecasts of the target variables crucial in monetary policy.
continuous recommitment means that the instrument rule is subject to reevaluation each decision cycle, such that
the instrument rule is revised if new information about the model and the transmission mechanism warrants this.
The timeless perspective involves a commitment by the central bank to minimize the unconditional expectation
of the loss function (equivalently, a commitment to the simple instrument rule ￿to which it would have wished
to commit itself to at a date far in the past, contingent upon the random events that have occurred in the
meantime￿).
This sophisticated commitment solves the problem ￿why is period 0 special?￿ It also allows for revision of the
instrument rule in the light of new information about the model. I cannot see that it allows for judgemental
adjustment and extra-model information other than in very restricted ways, counter to what Mike claims. Fur-
thermore, it does not solve the problem that any simple instrument rule is inherently ine¢cient by only using
part of the relevant information, so there would still be incentives to deviate from the instrument rule. Finally,
the implementation would require the central bank to issue a regular ￿Instrument-Rule Report￿ rather than the
In￿ation Reports currently issued by in￿ation-targeting central banks. This Instrument-Rule Report would detail
and motivate the new revision of the instrument rule and commit the central bank to this until further notice. It
would certainly be fascinating to see such a regime materialize in some country, if only to compare its performance
to already existing forecast targeting.
36 See, for instance, the contributions in Taylor [114] and, with regard to the performance of a Taylor rule for
the Eurosystem, Gerlach and Schnabel [45], Peersman and Smets [87] and Taylor [115].
37 I found this appropriate quote in Budd [21].
38 See Budd [21] for an illuminating and detailed discussion of the advantages of explicitly considering forecasts
rather than formulating reaction functions from observed variables to the instrument.
14Let us preliminarily make the assumption that the transmission mechanism is approximately
linear, in the sense that the future target variables depend linearly on the current state of the
economy and the instrument. Furthermore, make the preliminary assumption that any uncer-
tainty about the transmission mechanism and the state of the economy shows up as ￿additive￿
uncertainty about future target variables, in the sense that the degree of uncertainty about
future target variables only depends on the horizon but not on the current state of the econ-
omy and the instrument setting. It is then a standard result in optimal-control theory that
so-called certainty-equivalence applies, and that optimal policy need only focus on conditional
mean forecasts of the future target variables, forecasts conditional on the central bank￿s current
information and a particular future path for the instrument.39 Since this means treating the
forecasts as target variables, the procedure can be called forecast targeting.
This procedure thus involves making conditional forecasts of in￿ation and the output gap,
conditional on di⁄erent paths of the interest rate (the central bank￿s instrument), using all
relevant information about the current and the future state of the economy and the transmission
mechanism.40 Then, the interest rate path is chosen, for which the corresponding conditional
forecasts minimize the intertemporal loss function, (2.2), which, in practice, means that the
in￿ation forecast returns to the in￿ation target and that the corresponding conditional output-
gap forecast returns to zero, at an appropriate pace. If the in￿ation forecast is too high relative
to the in￿ation target at the relevant horizon (but the output-gap forecast is acceptable), the
interest rate path needs to be raised; if the conditional in￿ation forecast is too low, the interest
rate path needs to be lowered. The chosen interest rate path is then the basis for the current
interest setting.41 In regular decision cycles, the procedure is then repeated. If no new signi￿cant
information has arrived, the forecasts and the interest rate path are the same, and interest rate
setting follows the same interest rate path. If new signi￿cant information has arrived, the
39 For proof of the certainty-equivalence theorem for optimal-control theory, see Chow [24] for models with
predetermined variables only and Currie and Levin [30] for models with both predetermined and forward-looking
variables.
40 Constructing conditional forecasts in a backward-looking model (that is, a model without forward-looking
variables) is straightforward. Constructing such forecasts in a forward-looking model raises some speci￿c di¢-
culties, which are explained and resolved in the appendix of the working-paper version of Svensson [102]. The
conditional forecasts for an arbitrary interest-rate path derived there assume that the interest-rate paths are ￿cred-
ible￿, that is, anticipated and allowed to in￿uence the forward-looking variables. Leeper and Zha [73] present an
alternative way of constructing forecasts for arbitrary interest-rate paths, by assuming that these interest-rate
paths result from unanticipated deviations from a normal reaction function.
41 The procedure results in an implicit reaction function, where the instrument is an implicit function of all
information that goes into constructing the forecasts. To the extent that the current in￿ation and output gap are
important determinants of the conditional forecasts, they will be important arguments of this implicit reaction
function. Thus, forecast targeting is fully consistent with the instrument settings super￿cially appearing to follow
a Taylor-type rule. Since variables other than current in￿ation and the output gap also a⁄ect the forecasts
signi￿cantly, further scrutiny will normally reveal that the instrument also depends on those other variables.
15forecasts and the interest rate path are updated. This is the procedure recommended by Blinder
[14] and referred to as ￿dynamic programming￿ and ￿proper dynamic optimization.￿ Compared
to many other intertemporal decision problems that households, ￿rms and investors solve one
way or another (usually without the assistance of a sizeable sta⁄ of PhDs in economics), this
particular decision problem is, in principle, not overly complicated or di¢cult.42
Forecast targeting requires that the central bank has a view of what the policy multipliers are,
that is, how interest rate adjustments a⁄ect the conditional in￿ation and output gap forecasts.
But it does not imply that forecasts must be exclusively model-based. Instead, it allows for extra-
model information and judgemental adjustments, as well as very partial information about the
current state of the economy. It basically allows for any information that is relevant for the
in￿ation and output gap forecasts.
U n d e rt h ea b o v ea s s u m p t i o n so faq u a d r a t i cl o s sf u n c t i o na n da ne s s e n t i a l l yl i n e a rt r a n s -
mission mechanism together with additive uncertainty, the certainty-equivalence result implies
that the mean forecasts are the relevant target variables, regardless of the degree of uncertainty.
When the uncertainty about the transmission mechanism is ￿nonadditive,￿ that is, there is
uncertainty about the policy multipliers, or if the transmission mechanism is characterized by
signi￿cant nonlinearities, certainty-equivalence no longer applies, and the mean forecasts of the
target variables are not su¢cient. Instead, the ￿balance of risks￿ and indeed the whole prob-
ability distribution of the target variables matter. Forecast targeting can then be generalized
from mean forecast targeting to distribution forecast targeting.
Distribution forecast targeting Distribution forecast targeting consists of constructing con-
ditional probability distributions of the target variables instead of mean forecast only. Thus, for
a given interest-rate path, the central bank constructs the joint conditional density function of
the random path of in￿ation and the output gap, conditional upon all information available in
42 In a model with forward-looking variables, discretionary equilibria imply some ￿stabilization bias,￿ that is,
di⁄erent reaction coe¢cients in the reaction function compared to the optimal reaction function under commit-
ment. This implies some e¢ciency loss. This arises independently of any average in￿ation bias, cf. for instance
Svensson [98] and Clarida, Gali and Gertler [26]. As noted in Svensson [102, footnote 43], the extent to which
in￿ation targeting can remedy stabilization bias remains an open question. In his commentary, Michael Wood-
ford [127] argues that in￿ation-forecast targeting, by corresponding to decision making under discretion, implies
such a stabilization bias. However, the magnitude of the e¢ciency lost is likely to depend on the degree of
￿forward-lookingness￿ of the model; the model used by Mike is extremely forward-looking, but with substantial
backward-looking elements in addition to the forward-looking ones, the stabilization bias and the e¢ciency loss is
likely to be less. Furthermore, the emphasis on continuity, predictability and transparency in in￿ation targeting
(in line with the above statement ￿If no new signi￿cant information has arrived, the forecasts and the interest rate
path are the same, and interest rate setting follows the same interest rate path￿) may be interpreted as central
banks internalizing the costs of deviation without good reasons from previous forecasts, perhaps indirectly via a
concern about reputation, as modelled in Faust and Svensson [36], thus approaching the commitment equilibrium.
The potential for in￿ation-forecast targeting to achieve the optimal commitment equilibrium is further examined
in Svensson and Woodford [108].
16period t and a given interest-rate path. Then, this conditional probability distribution is used
to evaluate the loss function (2.2) with (2.1). This can either be done numerically, or infor-
mally, by the decision-making body of the bank. In the latter case, the decision-making body
is presented with the probability distributions for a few alternative interest rate paths and then
decides which path and distribution provides the best compromise.
Distribution forecast targeting is already practiced, to some extent. In￿ation-targeting cen-
tral banks have moved beyond mean forecast targeting, by considering the ￿balance of risks.￿
Furthermore, Bank of England and Sveriges Riksbank have developed methods for constructing
con￿dence intervals for the forecasts published in their In￿ation Reports (see Blix and Sellin
[16] and Britton, Fisher and Whitley [17]).43 Bank of England presents fan charts for both in-
￿ation and output, and Sveriges Riksbank gives con￿dence intervals for its in￿ation forecasts.44
45 Furthermore, scrutiny of the motivations for interest-rate changes (including the minutes
from Bank of England￿s Monetary Policy Committee and the Riksbank￿s Executive Board) indi-
cate that both banks occasionally depart from certainty-equivalence and take properties of the
whole distribution into account in their decisions, for instance, when the risk is unbalanced and
￿downside risk￿ di⁄er from ￿upside risk.￿
Transparency The above procedure may seem to involve an excessive amount of discretion.
What is there to ensure that the forecasts are unbiased and that the interest-rate decisions taken
follow from proper forecast targeting?46 This is where transparency enters in a crucial way,
and where some in￿ation-targeting central banks (in particular Reserve Bank of New Zealand,
Bank of England and Sveriges Riksbank) have broken very new ground. Transparent in￿ation
targeting means being explicit about the numerical in￿ation target (and increasingly explicit
about the weight on output-gap stabilization, as discussed in section 2.2 above). As argued in
more detail in Svensson [97] and [102], transparent in￿ation targeting can be interpreted as a
43 Banco Central do Brasil, the ￿rst central bank in a developing country to introduce in￿ation targeting, also
presents con￿dence intervals for its in￿ation forecasts, see [4].
44 Bank of England￿s fan charts for in￿ation and output should probably be interpreted as marginal distributions.
However, since the distributions for in￿ation and the output gap are unlikely to be independent, distribution
forecast targeting requires the joint distribution to be conveyed. This may require some further innovation in
display, beyond the already beautiful fan charts.
45 As discussed in Wallis [121], Bank of England￿s fan charts present prediction intervals that di⁄er from
normal con￿dence intervals (central prediction intervals). Sveriges Riksbank, however, presents normal con￿dence
intervals, see Blix and Sellin [16]. Both banks, in practice, emphasize the mode as their point forecast, whereas it
seems to me that it would be more natural and consistent with the theory to present the mean (or, in distribution
forecast targeting, at least the median).
46 As Vickers [119] discusses, what ensures that the procedure is ￿painting by numbers￿ (where the fan chart
is painted after the numbers have been constructed by proper assumptions and forecasting) and not ￿numbers by
painting￿ (where the assumptions are constructed after the desired fan chart has been painted so as to rationalize
the desired forecast)?
17￿targeting rule,￿ a commitment to do whatever it takes to minimize the loss function. Just
having an explicit in￿ation target goes a long way towards such a commitment. But the three
central banks mentioned have gone further, by regularly publishing their in￿ation forecasts and
the reasoning and main information behind these, and by using these forecast to motivate their
policy decisions. Not only does this seem to be the best way of motivating policy decisions;
this transparency also opens up the banks￿ analysis and reasoning to outside scrutiny (especially
when minutes from policy meetings are also published), maximizes the possibility for outsiders
to spot biases and deviations, and provides the best incentive in the history of monetary policy
for the central banks to do their job well.47 48
3.3 Monetary targeting and the role of money
Recent interest in monetary targeting has been stimulated by the view that monetary targeting
is the reason behind Bundesbank￿s outstanding record on in￿ation control and the possibility
that the Eurosystem would choose monetary targeting as its monetary-policy strategy. However,
with regard to whether monetary targeting lies behind Bundesbank￿s success, as discussed in,
for instance, Svensson [104], a number of studies of Bundesbank￿s monetary policy have come to
the unanimous conclusion that, in the frequent con￿icts between stabilizing in￿ation around the
in￿ation target and stabilizing money-growth around the money-growth target, Bundesbank has
consistently given priority to the in￿ation target and disregarded the monetary target.49 Thus,
Bundesbank has actually been a monetary targeter in words only and an in￿ation targeter in
deeds. Furthermore, the Eurosystem has strongly rejected monetary targeting as a suitable
strategy, on the grounds that the relation between prices and money may not be su¢ciently
stable and that the monetary aggregates with the best stability properties may not be su¢ciently
controllable (see Issing [60]). On the other hand, the Eurosystem has assigned a prominent role
to its money-growth indicator, the deviation of M3 growth from a reference value. Allan Meltzer
has, in a series of papers with Karl Brunner and in [81], for instance, consistently argued for a
prominent role for money, as an indicator, target or instrument.50
47 Bernanke and Mishkin [13] have appropriately called this ￿constrained discretion.￿
48 Faust and Svensson [36], building on the classic paper by Cukierman and Meltzer [28], provide a formal argu-
ment why increased transparency increases the credibility costs to a central bank from deviating from announced
goals and, in this way, provides an implicit mechanism for commitment to those goals.
49 This litureature includes Neumann [85], von Hagen [120], Bernanke and Mihov [12], Clarida and Gertler [27],
Clarida, Gali and Gertler [25] (note a crucial typo: the coe¢cient for money supply in Table 1 should be 0.07
instead of 0.7), Laubach and Posen [71], and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen [11].
50 Brunner and Meltzer [18] provide a ￿robust control￿ argument for monetary targeting. They argue that
monetary targeting would be the least harmful to the economy for any model of the transmission mechanism and
hence is advisable, given su¢cient uncertainty about the true model. They express this as a min-max criterion,
18Some 25 years ago, several authors concluded that intermediate-variable targeting in gen-
eral (and monetary targeting in particular) is inferior in most circumstances.51 When would
monetary targeting, meaning money-growth targeting, be optimal? This requires that the trans-
mission mechanism is recursive in a particular way. The instrument and the state of the economy
must a⁄ect the target variables exclusively by ￿rst a⁄ecting money growth, and then by money
growth a⁄ecting the target variables.52 Suppose in￿ation is the only target variable (that is,
assume strict in￿ation targeting). Then, schematically, we need to have
instrument




) money growth ) in￿ation.
Money growth would then be the only determinant of in￿ation. If so, money-growth targeting,
that is, stabilizing money around a money-growth target corresponding to the in￿ation target,
would be equivalent to stabilizing in￿ation around the in￿ation target.53
Clearly, such recursiveness of the transmission mechanism, that money growth would be
the sole determinant of in￿ation, is an extreme and unrealistic case. In the real world, and in
reasonable models, there are several channels of transmission from the instrument to in￿ation.
The transmission mechanism is too complex for intermediate variables in the above sense to
exist, that is, the transmission mechanism is not recursive in the above sense.54
Therefore, intermediate-variable targeting in general, and monetary targeting in particular, is
an inferior monetary-policy strategy. However, there is one exception to the general nonexistence
of suitable intermediate-target variables. As discussed in Svensson [97] and [102], one set of
intermediate-target variables always exists, namely conditional forecasts. We can always write
instrument




) conditional forecast of target variable ) target variable,
where the target variable di⁄ers from the conditional forecast by an error that is uncorrelated
with the instrument and the information about the state of the economy. Formally, conditional
forecasts of target variables can be seen as intermediate target variables. As Mervyn King [64]
some 30 years before such a robust-control approach to optimal-control theory was reintroduced to economics by
Hansen and Sargent [54].
51 See Bryant [19], Friedman [43], Kalchbrenner and Tinsley [62] and Kareken, Muench and Wallace [63].
52 Note that I refer to broad money here, M1-M3, say. Broad money is an endogenous variable, imperfectly con-
trolled by the central bank and distinct from the monetary policy instrument (a short interest rate or nonborrowed
reserves, for instance) used to control broad money.
53 Actually, if money growth were the only determinant of future in￿ation, it would be the only determinant of
the in￿ation forecast. Then, in￿ation-forecast targeting would automatically imply monetary targeting.
54 Although, money growth and in￿ation are highly corrlated in the long run, they are not su¢ciently correlated
at the horizons relevant to monetary policy.
19stated early in the history of in￿ation targeting, in￿ation targeting can be interpreted as having
in￿ation forecasts as intermediate targets.
Thus, money-growth targeting is optimal (for strict in￿ation targeting) only if money growth
is the sole predictor of future in￿ation. Since money growth is not the sole predictor of in￿ation
(nor even the main predictor at horizons relevant for monetary policy),55 how ine¢cient would
money-growth targeting be? Rudebusch and Svensson [93] examine this issue with U.S. data, in
an empirical model of U.S. in￿ation, output and money. In the model, in￿ation is determined by
a conventional accelerationist Phillips curve, where in￿ation is determined by lagged in￿ation and
the output gap. The output gap is determined by a conventional aggregate demand equation,
where it is determined by the lagged output gap and the real federal funds rate. Money is
determined by a conventional error-correction money-demand equation, where the change in
(log) real M2 balances adjusts to the lagged deviation of (log) real balances from a conventional
long-run money-demand equation. These equations all ￿t the data quite well.56
Thus, the transmission mechanism in this model is the conventional interest rate channel:
in￿ation expectations are sticky, so the nominal federal funds rate determines the real federal
funds rate, which a⁄ects the output gap one quarter ahead which, in turn, a⁄ects in￿ation
two quarters ahead. M2 has no direct role in the transmission mechanism, and is determined
separately from the money-demand function. Since money demand is demand for real money,
nominal money and nominal prices are highly correlated in the long run, as in the data and any
reasonable monetary model. Still, this long-run correlation is irrelevant at the horizon relevant
for monetary policy.
The estimated money-demand function is well behaved and money is quite controllable.
Nevertheless, the results unambiguously show that, although monetary targeting can, not sur-
prisingly, achieve the same average in￿ation as in￿ation targeting, it would be quite ine¢cient
for the U.S., in the sense of causing much higher variability of in￿ation and the output gap
than in￿ation targeting (both variances roughly doubles). Furthermore, setting money-demand
shocks equal to zero, and thus assuming a completely stable money demand, only marginally
reduces the ine¢ciency of monetary targeting.
Thus, counter to conventional wisdom, the results indicate that the reason why monetary
targeting is ine¢cient is not the instability of money demand. Instead, regardless of the stability
55 See Estrella and Mishkin [34].
56 Especially since the period after 1990 with considerable volatility of M2 velocity is excluded from the sample,
so as to bias the result in favor of monetary targeting.
20of money demand, since money growth is not a predictor of in￿ation and the output gap,
stabilizing money growth does not mean stabilizing in￿ation and the output gap. The dynamics
of money demand is such that the reaction function for the federal funds rate resulting from
stabilizing money growth is quite unsuitable for stabilizing in￿ation and the output gap, also if
there are no shocks to money demand.
In contrast to the model in Rudebusch and Svensson [93] described above, the so-called P⁄
model (see Hallman, Porter and Small [53] and T￿dter and Reimers [117]) assigns a direct role
to monetary aggregates in determining in￿ation. In￿ation is then not determined by the lagged
output gap but by the lagged ￿price gap,￿ the gap between the price level and the long-run
equilibrium price level that would result with the current money stock, if output were at its
potential level and velocity were at its long-run equilibrium price level. The price gap is equal
to the negative of the ￿real money gap,￿ the di⁄erence between current real balances and long-
run equilibrium real balances. The P⁄ model is typically seen among proponents for monetary
targeting as providing a theoretical rationale for focusing policy deliberations on the behavior of
monetary aggregates.57 Nevertheless, Svensson [101] shows that, although the P⁄ model gives
a prominent role to monetary aggregates in the form of the real money gap, it does not provide
a rationale for money-growth targeting.
For the euro area, Gerlach and Svensson [46] provide a preliminary study of the relationship
between in￿ation, output, money and interest rates, using reconstructed historical data. The
P⁄ model is shown to have substantial empirical support. The real money gap is shown to have
substantial predictive power for 4-quarter in￿ation 4 and 8 quarters ahead, with some additional
information in the output gap. Gerlach and Svensson also consider a Eurosystem-type money-
growth indicator, 4-quarter growth of M3 relative a Eurosystem-style reference value. They ￿nd
that the money-growth indicator has little or no marginal predictive power for future in￿ation.
Thus, they ￿nd little empirical support for the prominent role that the Eurosystem has assigned
to its money-growth indicator.
In the end, a rational treatment of indicators suggests that the weights on any given indicator
depends exclusively on its power in predicting future in￿ation and the output gap. It seems that
monetary aggregates should have no special role beyond that, and that any weight on monetary
aggregates should exclusively depend on their predictive performance for future in￿ation and
57 The P
⁄ model is used to discuss Bundesbank monetary targeting in Jahnke and Reimers [61], Neumann [85],
T￿dter and Reimers [117] and von Hagen [120]. This may give the impression that the P
⁄ model provides some
rationale for money-growth targeting, especially since this model seems to be part of the Bundesbank￿s view of
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, see Jahnke and Reimers [61].
21the output gap. In the P⁄ model and (according to Gerlach and Svensson [46]) in the euro
area, in￿ation seems to be a⁄ected via a strong direct real-money channel. Meltzer [83] and
Nelson [84] report an empirical direct real-money channel a⁄ecting demand, separate from the
e⁄ect of a short real interest rate (although Nelson interprets this as a proxy for the e⁄ect of
a long interest rate). Woodford [130] ￿nds that any direct real-money e⁄ect on consumption
and demand is likely to be very small. In the model in Rudebusch and Svensson [93], there
is no direct real-money channel to in￿ation and output. Even if there are strong such real-
money e⁄ects on demand and/or in￿ation, this is not an argument for monetary targeting (or
an argument for a Eurosystem-style money-growth indicator). At most, it is an argument for
including real money aggregates among the many indicators a⁄ecting the forecasts of the target
variables, in￿ation and the output gap.
4 Bene￿ts of credibility
An era of low and stable in￿ation also creates low and stable in￿ation expectations, either by
forward-looking observers who judge that the central banks￿ goals are now to maintain price
stability and that the environment is unlikely to prevent them from achieving their goals, or by
more backward-looking observers using history to assess future in￿ation outcomes. Expectations
of low and stable in￿ation can be interpreted as good credibility for the low-in￿ation regime.
Let me now discuss the role of credibility and the potential bene￿ts of credibility in a monetary
policy aimed at low in￿ation.
4.1 De￿ning and measuring credibility
Blinder￿s [15] favorite de￿nition of credibility involves ￿words matching deeds￿: ￿A central bank
is credible if people believe it will do what it says.￿ With an announced policy goal, credibility
t h e nb o i l sd o w nt op r i v a t ee x p e c t a t i o n sb e i n gc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h eg o a l .F o rac e n t r a lb a n kw i t h
an explicit in￿ation target, it is then natural to de￿ne credibility as private in￿ation expectations
coinciding with the in￿ation target, and to let deviations of private in￿ation expectations from
the in￿ation target indicate a lack of credibility (both when in￿ation expectations are above and
below the target). Since in￿ation expectations can be measured or estimated, for instance, from
surveys or from nominal and real yield curves, this allows the explicit measurement of the degree
of credibility. In￿ation-targeting central banks regularly include measures of private in￿ation
22Figure 4.1: In￿ation expectations, Sweden 1991:1￿1999:2
expectations in their In￿ation Reports.58
Figure 4.1 shows survey data of in￿ation expectations for the Swedish CPI of investors on the
S w e d i s hb o n dm a r k e t . 59 For each quarter, the thin line shows mean in￿ation expectations for the
n e x t2y e a r s .T h es e m i - t h i c kl i n es h o w st h es a m ef o rt h en e x t5y e a r s .T h et h i c kl i n es h o w st h e
implied expectations for years 3￿5. The in￿ation target of 2 percent per year, with a tolerance
interval of plus/minus 1 percentage point, was announced by the Riksbank in January 1993, to be
e⁄ective from 1995 onwards (shown as horizontal solid and dashed lines). We see that credibility
was low during the ￿rst few years of the in￿ation-targeting regime, with expectations for years
3￿5 far above the upper bound of the tolerance interval. From 1997, in￿ation expectations
have been well inside the tolerance interval, and from 1998, 5-year expectations and 3￿5 year
expectations have been close to the 2 percent in￿ation target, indicating that the credibility is
now good.
Thus, one of the many bene￿ts associated with an announced explicit in￿ation target is that
t h ed e g r e eo fc r e d i b i l i t yi se a s i l ym e a s u r e d .T h ea b s e n c eo fa ne x p l i c i tt a r g e t ,a si nt h ec a s eo f
the Fed, or a somewhat ambiguous de￿nition of the target, as in the case of the Eurosystem,60
makes the credibility less well-de￿ned and less observable.
58 Similarly, for a ￿xed exchange rate regime, a natural indicator of lack of credibility is the di⁄erence between
expected future exchange rates and the announced central parity; see, for instance, Svensson [95].
59 The survey is undertaken each quarter by Aragon Securities Fondkomission, Stockholm.
60 See Svensson [104] for a discussion of alternative interpretations of the Eurosystem￿s in￿ation target.
234.2 Bene￿ts of credibility
Central bankers often appear obsessed with the notion of credibility, for which I believe there
to be a good reason. Credibility indeed bring considerable bene￿ts to a monetary policy aimed
at low in￿ation. So, what are these bene￿ts?
In a conventional model of in￿ation determination, in￿ation is determined by in￿ation ex-
pectations and costs, the latter, in turn, depending on (among other variables) the output gap or
unemployment. For given in￿ation expectations, monetary policy then mainly a⁄ects in￿ation
via its e⁄ects on real activity.61
Now, with an explicit in￿ation target, credibility means that in￿ation expectations some two
years ahead and more are stable and close to the in￿ation target. Compared to a situation with
￿in￿ation scares￿ (Goodfriend [47]) and ￿uctuating in￿ation expectations, this eliminates an
important source of disturbances to in￿ation. Furthermore, credibility introduces considerable
mean reversion of in￿ation towards the in￿ation target. Consequently, there is less need for
monetary policy to a⁄ect real activity in order to keep in￿ation close to the target. As a result,
it is easier for the central bank to ful￿ll the in￿ation target, and a more favorable tradeo⁄
between in￿ation variability and output gap variability arises.62
Furthermore, in this conventional model of the transmission mechanism, the monetary-policy
instrument, a short nominal interest rate, a⁄ects real activity according to the following sequence.
Because of sticky in￿ation expectations, the short nominal rate a⁄ects the short real interest
rate rate. Expectations of future short nominal rates and future in￿ation a⁄ect longer real rates.
These, in turn, a⁄ect real activity.63 64
Now, if in￿ation expectations are stable around the in￿ation target, an important source of
disturbances in the above sequence is removed. Furthermore, with stable in￿ation expectations,
the impact of the short nominal rate on the short real rate is more direct and stable. For
instance, for a shock increasing in￿ation, the required increase in the short nominal rate to
achieve a given increase in the short real rate is smaller than when in￿ation expectations also
rise. Therefore, less movement of the instrument is normally required to achieve a given change
61 In an open economy, as discussed in some detail in Svensson [105], costs are also a⁄ected by the exchange
rate, and monetary policy alsoa⁄ects in￿ation via its e⁄ect on the exchange rate. The exchange rate then feeds
into the CPI via imported ￿nal goods, but also into costs via imported intermediate inputs.
62 In an open economy, in￿ation expectations a⁄ect expectations of the future nominal exchange rate, which
a⁄ects the current nominal exchange rate and, with sticky prices, the current real exchange rate. Stable in￿ation
expectations then reduce disturbances to the real exchange rate.
63 See Clarida, Gali and Gertler [26] for a survey of recent work on the transmission mechanism along these
lines. See also Taylor [111].
64 In an open economy, the real interest rate di⁄erential to foreign interest rates also a⁄ects the real exchange
rate which, in turn, both a⁄ects real activity and costs.
24in real activity. Thus, the tradeo⁄ between output-gap variability and instrument variability
improves.
Figure 4.2 illustrates such an improved tradeo⁄ for U.S. data. The solid curve, labeled ￿Low
credibility,￿ shows the tradeo⁄ between in￿ation variability and output-gap variability estimated
for the U.S. in Rudebusch and Svensson [92]. The curve shows the e¢cient combinations of
variances of in￿ation and the output gap in an empirical model of U.S. in￿ation and output. The
northwestern end of the curve corresponds to strict in￿ation targeting, when there is zero weight
on output gap stabilization. Points further southeast on the curve correspond to ￿exible in￿ation
targeting with increased weight on output-gap stabilization.65 The point FIT corresponds to
￿exible in￿ation targeting with the weight on output-gap stabilization equal to half that on
in￿ation stabilization (‚ =0 : 5 ).
Behind the solid curve is an empirical Phillips curve,
…t+1 = …e
t + ﬁy(yt ¡ y⁄
t)+" t +1;
where …t is in￿ation in quarter t, "t is an exogenous ￿cost-push￿ shock to in￿ation, and …e
t can
be interpreted as in￿ation expectations in quarter t. These in￿ation expectations depend on






where the coe¢cients sum to unity,
P3
¿=0 ﬁ…¿ =1(the hypothesis of a unit sum cannot be
rejected). When the coe¢cients sum to unity, there is no mean reversion in in￿ation (when
the Phillips curve is considered in isolation). This can be interpreted as in￿ation expectations
being exclusively determined by history, with a zero weight on any speci￿c in￿ation target, and
therefore corresponding to low credibility.
Suppose, more generally, that in￿ation expectations are given by a weighted average of an
in￿ation target and history,
…e




where …⁄ is a constant in￿ation target and ﬁ⁄ is the weight on the in￿ation target in the in￿ation
expectations. Then we can interpret ﬁ⁄ as an index of credibility of the in￿ation target, with ﬁ⁄
65 The loss function is Lt =[ ( … t¡…
⁄)




2]=(1+‚+:2),t h u sa l l o w i n gf o rs o m ew e i g h t
on interest-rate smoothing. The weight ‚ varies from zero (corresponding to strict in￿ation targeting) to in￿nity
(corresponding to strict output-gap targeting).
25Figure 4.2: Variance tradeo⁄s for low and high credibility, United States
equal to zero corresponding to the above case of low credibility and a positive ﬁ⁄ corresponding
to higher credibility. A positive ﬁ⁄ then causes mean reversion of the in￿ation towards the
in￿ation target.66
The dashed curve in ￿gure 4.2, labeled ￿High credibility,￿ shows the tradeo⁄ resulting if
the weight on the in￿ation target in in￿ation expectations is raised from zero to a modest 0.1
(ﬁ⁄ =0 : 1 ). This modest improvement in credibility improves the tradeo⁄ substantially.67
Thus, stable in￿ation expectations makes the in￿ation target easier to achieve. The tradeo⁄
between in￿ation variability, output-gap variability and instrument variability improves. Control
is improved, but the economy is increasingly on automatic pilot, so less control needs to be exer-
cised. These circumstances make it easier for the central bank to meet is targets. Furthermore,
credibility helps avoid any liquidity trap, the topic of section 5.
66 Kuttner and Posen [70] report some evidence of increased mean-reversion, that is, reduced persistence, of
in￿ation after in￿ation targeting was introduced in New Zeeland, Canada and the U.K.
67 This is the case even without any modi￿cation of the empirical aggregate-demand function. Modifying
the in￿ation expectations in the aggregate-demand function to incorporate improved credibility in the form of
a positive weight on the in￿ation target would further improve the tradeo⁄ between in￿ation and output-gap
variability. This is because the improved tradeo⁄ between interest-rate and output-gap variability would then
give rise to a more favorable tradeo⁄ between in￿ation and output-gap variability for any given weight on interest-
rate smoothing in the loss function.
265 Threats of de￿ation
For several decades, high in￿ation has been the main threat to monetary stability. The successful
disin￿ation and current low in￿ation rate in many countries, together with the problematic
situation in Japan, has brought the potential threat of de￿ation into focus. As the Economist
[32] wrote in its February 20, 1999, issue, under the heading ￿The New Danger￿:
For many years the main economic enemy was in￿ation. Today, prices are rising
more slowly in the G7 economies than for half a century. As Japan has learned, and
Europe may soon ￿nd out, there is a new danger￿falling prices may lock countries
into a spiral of economic decline.
Here, it is worth emphasizing that there is a big di⁄erence between a few quarters of de￿ation
that is expected to be only temporary (or a situation when the zero lower bound on the interest
is temporarily binding), and a situation of several years with persistent de￿ation, de￿ationary
expectations, zero interest rates and ine⁄ective monetary policy, what has been called a liquidity
trap. The former situation, the occasionally binding zero bound on the short nominal interest
rate, was brie￿y discussed in section 2.3, with the conclusion that the appropriate in￿ation target
is positive, although small. The latter situation, the liquidity trap, how it is avoided, and how
to escape if already trapped, is the subject of this section.68
5.1 What is a liquidity trap?
In a liquidity trap, the economy is satiated with liquidity and the nominal interest rate is zero.
By the Fisher equation, expected in￿ation equals the nominal interest rate minus the real interest
rate. If the nominal interest rate is zero, expected in￿ation then equals the negative of the real
interest rate. If the real interest rate is positive, we have expected de￿ation. In a steady state,
actual de￿ation and expected de￿ation coincide. Thus, by a liquidity trap, I mean a situation
with zero interest rates, persistent de￿ation and persistent de￿ation expectations.
In a liquidity trap, monetary policy is ine⁄ective, in the following sense. A zero nominal
interest rate means that nominal bonds and money earn the same real rate of return. Therefore,
money in excess of transactions balances are perfect substitutes for bonds, and the private sector
is indi⁄erent between holding bonds or excess money. Expansionary open-market operations,
where the central bank purchases bonds and increases the monetary base, then have no e⁄ects
68 Recent work on de￿ation, liquidity traps and/or Japan, include Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [22], BIS [7, section
IV], Krugman [68] and [69], Meltzer [82] and [83], Posen [88], Tetlow and Williams [116], Wolman [126] and [125],
and Woodford [130].
27on nominal and real prices and quantities. The private sector just holds the increased monetary
base instead of bonds. Monetary policy is then completely ine⁄ective. This is true, at least as
long as there are still outstanding government bonds, and as long as expectations are de￿ationary
and the private sector believes that the situation will persist.
In an open economy with a ￿exible exchange rate, the exchange rate channel of the transmis-
sion mechanism may increase the e⁄ect of monetary policy actions (see Svensson [105]), make the
nonnegativity constraint for the nominal interest rate less binding and improve the possibility
of avoiding a liquidity trap.
Once in a liquidity trap, will foreign exchange interventions be more e⁄ective than open-
market operations in domestic assets? To the extent that the exchange rate is determined by an
interest-rate parity condition involving the interest rate di⁄erential relative to foreign interest
rates, once domestic interest rates are zero, the domestic currency is expected to appreciate
over time and the current exchange rate varies with the expected future exchange rate. If real-
exchange-rate expectations do not change, the expected future exchange rate varies with the
expected future price level. If de￿ationary expectations do not change, nonsterilized foreign-
exchange interventions are then unlikely to a⁄ect the current exchange rate (not to speak of
sterilized foreign-exchange interventions). Considered in this way, nonsterilized foreign-exchange
interventions seem unlikely to be more e⁄ective than open-market operations in domestic assets
(unless they a⁄ect foreign-exchange risk premia di⁄erently). On the other hand, as further
discussed below, it cannot be excluded that arbitrarily large foreign exchange interventions in
an attempt to peg the exchange rate may succeed in stabilizing the exchange rate and break the
expectations of further appreciation.
Private beliefs that the liquidity trap will persist is an important aspect of the liquidity trap.
If expectations are reasonably consistent, expectations of a continued liquidity trap include be-
liefs that the nominal liabilities (the sum of the monetary base and outstanding government
bonds) of the consolidated government (the ￿scal authority and the central bank) must eventu-
ally fall over time. Otherwise, because of de￿ation, the real value of consolidated government
liabilities would grow without bound and, in the end, exceed the economy￿s real assets, which
is impossible. In technical jargon, and as explained in some detail in appendix B, a transver-
sality condition would be violated. Therefore, private beliefs in the continuation of a liquidity
trap must, if consistent, involve beliefs that eventually, at least far into the future, the nominal
monetary base and nominal government liabilities must fall, which is worth keeping in mind.
28This concern about a liquidity trap may seem surprising, when we recall that a zero nominal
interest rate corresponds to Milton Friedman￿s [44] ￿optimum quantity of money,￿ the ideal
state when the economy is satiated with liquidity and there is no longer any lost consumer
surplus from keeping the opportunity cost of liquidity (the interest rate) above the marginal
cost of increasing the supply of liquidity (zero, for all practical purposes). Why would this
situation, nevertheless, be undesirable? First, since there are other distortionary taxes in the
economy and a positive interest rate implies a positive so-called in￿ation tax on money, there
is a well-known optimal-taxation argument in favor of a positive interest rate and less de￿ation
than the real interest rate (or even positive in￿ation), which would allow the reduction of more
distortionary taxes. On the other hand, seignorage is such a small part of government revenues in
industrial countries that this case for positive interest rates is generally considered rather weak.
Second, de￿ation is not price stability, and the absence of price stability is likely to increase
information costs, infer with the market mechanism and resource allocation, and make long-
term planning more di¢cult. On the other hand, there would be no need for discounting when
making intertemporal price comparisons! Third, more importantly, we may doubt that there is
su¢cient downward ￿exibility in nominal prices and wages in the short and medium run to make
de￿ation neutral (due to existing multi-year contracts, for instance). If nominal wage adjustment
lags behind, higher real wages will hurt employment and production. Flexibility in nominal debt
contracts may also lag behind, increasing real debts (so-called ￿debt de￿ation￿) and inducing
bankruptcies, ￿nancial-sector weakness and associated production disturbances, for instance,
via the credit channel and the ￿nancial accelerator (see Bernanke and Gertler [10]). Fourth, and
arguably equally importantly, the ine⁄ectiveness of monetary policy removes all possibilities of
using monetary policy for stabilization purposes (although the weight of this argument clearly
depends on one￿s view of the bene￿ts and costs of monetary stabilization policy). For these
reasons, most macro researchers and practically all monetary-policy makers have come to the
conclusions that, although a steady de￿ation may, in theory, be completely neutral, in practice,
a liquidity trap is likely to bring considerable instability and probably lower real activity (and
perhaps even the downward spiral warned against by the Economist a n dm o d e l l e db yB u i t e r
and Panigirtzoglou [22], Krugman [69] and Tetlow and Williams [116]), relative to a monetary
regime with a zero or moderately positive in￿ation target (or a ￿at or moderately increasing
price-level target).69
69 Wolman [125] and [126] models both the bene￿ts of liquidity and the costs of the zero bound on nominal
interest rates.
29Thus, it makes eminent sense to avoid a liquidity trap and escape from it if already trapped.
5.2 How to avoid a liquidity trap?
So, what is the best way of avoiding a liquidity trap? Since a liquidity trap involves de￿ation
and de￿ation expectations equal to the real interest rate, it is crucial to prevent in￿ation and
in￿ation expectations from falling to such levels. Then, the central bank should keep in￿ation
and in￿ation expectations at safe distances from such levels, watch out for warnings of falls
in in￿ation and in￿ation expectations, and react to such warnings in time. This is, of course,
precisely what is done under in￿ation targeting.
As discussed in section 2.3, an explicit in￿ation target of 2 percent, say, should provide an
ample margin to the liquidity trap. Suppose transparent in￿ation targeting succeeds in making
this target credible, so that private in￿ation expectations are anchored at the target. If the
normal real interest rate is some 2 percent, the average nominal interest will then be around 4
percent. If the in￿ation target remains credible, so that in￿ation expectations remain around 2
percent, reducing the nominal interest rate to zero gives a real interest rate of minus 2 percent,
4 percentage points below the normal real interest rate. This should, in most cases, provide
ample stimulus to the economy.
Indeed, in￿ation targeting, in the form of forecast targeting as discussed in section 3.2,
automatically means watching for warnings of changes in future in￿ation and reacting in time.
Forecast targeting means using available information about the economy and the transmission
mechanism to make in￿ation (and output gap) forecasts for the relevant policy horizon (the
horizon at which the current instrument setting has a signi￿cant impact), and setting the interest
rate such that the in￿ation forecast conditional on this interest rate is close to the in￿ation target
at the appropriate horizon. This also means watching for warnings of both upside and downside
risk for future in￿ation, as well as watching private in￿ation expectations (measured from surveys
and inferred from nominal and real yield curves), shocks to the economy, etc.
Here, it is important that the in￿ation target is symmetric and unambiguous (and is perceived
as such by the private sector), and that the central bank acts as decisively to downward risks
as to upward risks. Furthermore, as discussed in section 2.3, a point in￿ation target (or an
emphasized midpoint of a target range) gives a desirable focal point for in￿ation expectations.
A somewhat ambiguous and asymmetric target, like the Eurosystem￿s ￿below 2 percent,￿ is here
problematic.
30Contingency plans and emergency measures T h ea b o v es h o u l dg oal o n gw a yt op r e v e n t
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Japan pursued an in￿ation target as above in the 1990￿s (as Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bank
of Canada, Bank of England, Sveriges Riksbank and other in￿ation-targeting central banks),
Japan would have avoided the current de￿ationary tendencies and indications of a liquidity
trap (although even such monetary policy would hardly have reduced the need for structural
and ￿nancial reform discussed in Posen [88], for instance).70 Still, given the potential harm a
liquidity trap may cause, and given the small, but still positive risk that a series of unfortunate
shocks may push even an exemplary in￿ation-targeting regime close to a liquidity trap, it seems
prudent for central banks and ￿scal authorities to prepare for the worst. Thus, in order to
further reduce the risk of a falling into a liquidity trap, it seems advantageous for central banks
and ￿scal authorities to make advance contingency plans for a series of emergency measures
to be undertaken at prescribed indications of an imminent liquidity trap, but only under such
prescribed indications.
Such measures would aim at raising the central bank￿s in￿ation forecast and private in￿ation
expectations towards the in￿ation target, if these have fallen to dangerous levels. They can
be ordered in a hierarchy of increasingly expansionary steps. Thus, if ordinary open-market
operations (repurchase agreements and sales and purchases of Treasury bills) become ine⁄ective,
because short nominal interest rates have reached zero, government bond rates are still likely to
be positive. Then, interventions in longer government bonds may still have an e⁄ect on longer
bond rates and be able to further stimulate the economy. If these longer bond rates fall close to
zero, more unorthodox open-market interventions can still be undertaken, in corporate bonds,
property and stocks. Opening a lending window for lending directly to the private sector is
another unorthodox measure for lowering private borrowing rates.71 72
A further measure is a coordinated ￿scal and monetary expansion, a ￿scal expansion ￿-
70 It may be interesting to compare with the recent experience in Sweden. Swedish 12-month CPI in￿ation
fell to de￿ation of almost 0.5 percent in the third and fourth quarter of 1998 and came back to zero only in
the second quarter of 1999. Underlying in￿ation (excluding interest rate costs and indirect taxes), on which the
Riksbank has put increasing weight over the years, was running at around 1 percent, the lower bound of the
plus/minus 1 percentage point tolerance interval around the 2-percent in￿ation target. Neither the Riksbank
nor the general public seem to have been worried about this situation developing into a liquidity trap. The
Riksbank has emphasized that the CPI has undershot the target because of a series of temporary shocks. In￿ation
expectations 3￿5 years ahead have been anchored on the in￿ation target, see ￿gure 4.1. The Riksbank￿s in￿ation
forecasts (for underlying in￿ation 2 years ahead) have been close to the target, and the Riksbank has not felt
compelled to lower the short interest rate below the current 2.9 percent, thus with an ample margin to the zero
bound.
71 See Lebow [72] for an early discussion of such unorthodox monetary-policy actions.
72 When there are legal restrictions on what assets the central bank can hold, these measures may require
legislated escape clauses.
31nanced by a corresponding monetary expansion (that is, ￿nanced by the ￿scal authority issuing
government bonds that are immediately bought by the central bank). Here, it may be desirable
to direct the ￿scal expansion towards expenditure imperfectly substitutable for private con-
sumption, so as to reduce compensating adjustments of private expenditure. For this purpose,
spending on public infrastructure, law and order, defense, education, and medical care would
seem more e⁄ective than cash transfers or tax cuts to the private sector (unless the taxes cut
are very distortionary). Although, in theory, it need not matter much how this ￿scal expan-
sion is ￿nanced, a monetary expansion would, in practice, seem more likely to increase in￿ation
expectations and not reduce private expenditure, than to increase borrowing.73
Price-level targeting and the liquidity trap The above discussion has argued that a
credible in￿ation target is a good way of avoiding liquidity traps. However, as argued in section
2, price-level targeting may have advantages beyond in￿ation targeting. In particular, price-
level targeting may have a special advantage with regard to avoiding a liquidity trap. Under
credible price-level targeting (with a constant or moderately increasing price-level target), a
de￿ationary shock that pulls the price level below target would automatically create private
in￿ation expectations, if the price-level target is credible and the price-level is expected to
return to target. This increase in in￿ation expectations would automatically lower the short
real interest rate, even without a lowering of the short nominal interest rate. Under credible
in￿ation targeting, in contrast, in￿ation expectations would remain at the in￿ation target and
not, by themselves, lower the real interest rate. Further research seems required to assess whether
this is a signi￿cant advantage over in￿ation targeting, though.
5.3 How to escape from a liquidity trap?
The above emergency measures should not only be suitable for avoiding a threatening liquidity
trap, but also helpful in escaping from a liquidity trap. To a large extent, escaping from a liquid-
ity trap is about restoring con￿dence and getting rid of private-sector de￿ationary expectations,
as emphasized by Krugman [68] and Posen [88]. Although any in￿ation expectations would be
helpful in the short run, as emphasized by Posen [88], it is advantageous to anchor in￿ation ex-
pectations to a suitable in￿ation target, that is, getting a credible in￿ation target. This should
73 When modern central-bank legislation, for sound reasons of central-bank independence, include prohibitions
on ￿scal-authority borrowing in the central bank, such ￿scal and monetary coordination may require either
legislated escape clauses or that the central bank takes the initiative to the cooperation.
32help avoiding the opposite problem, getting too high and/or unstable in￿ation expectations and
risking a change to a high, unstable and uncertain in￿ation rate.
If the central bank, for some reason, has no explicit in￿ation target, announcing one is a
￿rst step to provide a focus for in￿ation expectations. For Japan, Krugman [68] has suggested
a 4 percent in￿ation target for 15 years. A more moderate target may be more credible, in the
sense that it may be more desirable to keep it unchanged after having escaped from the liquidity
trap. For Japan, Posen [88] has suggested an initial in￿ation target of 3 percent, to be reduced
to 2 percent within a few speci￿ed years. Such an announced falling in￿ation target may be the
optimal arrangement.
An announcement is not likely to be enough, though. Setting up the whole framework, with
published in￿ation forecasts, transparent in￿ation reports, etc., is a more serious commitment.
Acting accordingly, motivating the interventions, explaining the role of the emergency measures,
etc., is then a natural ingredient in building credibility for the in￿ation target and getting rid
of de￿ationary expectations.
If the private expectations of de￿ation start changing towards those of in￿ation, the real
interest rate falls and monetary policy starts being e⁄ective. If the expectations of de￿ation
remain, monetary policy remains ine⁄ective. A coordinated ￿scal and monetary expansion may
still start pushing the economy out of the liquidity trap.
As mentioned above, for an open economy, a liquidity trap with zero interest rates implies
that the domestic currency is expected to appreciate relative to the rest of the world, if the rest
of the world has positive interest rates. In a steady state with domestic de￿ation and moderate
foreign in￿ation, there will be a steady appreciation of the domestic currency. Could the central
bank peg the exchange rate and this way escape the liquidity trap? Such pegging would involve
a commitment to arbitrarily large nonsterilized foreign-exchange interventions, buying foreign
exchange and selling domestic currency at the pegged rate. Again, for such pegging to succeed,
market expectations of future appreciation would have to change. If they do not change, huge
foreign-exchange interventions could be absorbed by the foreign-exchange market. The question
is then, in such a game of attrition, who will blink ￿rst, the market or the central bank?
Compared to the usual speculative attack on a pegged exchange rate to force a devaluation, the
central bank does not risk running out of foreign exchange reserves; instead it just has to create
more domestic currency. The fact that a commitment to a pegged exchange rate is immediately
veri￿able and the technical possibility to always create more domestic currency may make the
33commitment more credible in the short run than a commitment to an in￿ation target when
interest rates have reached zero. It cannot be excluded that an exchange-rate peg can serve as
a temporary emergency measure, an intermediate step towards ful￿lling an in￿ation target.
As noted above, demonstrated in appendix B and shown rigorously and in detail in Woodford
[130], consistency of private de￿ationary expectations requires beliefs that the nominal monetary
base and nominal consolidated government liabilities must eventually decrease. Otherwise, the
real value of these would rise to impossible levels. Thus, a credible commitment not to reduce
the future nominal monetary base or total future government liabilities would be su¢cient for
de￿ation not to be expected inde￿nitely. How practical, and how convincing, such a commitment
would be is an open issue. Expansion of the monetary base or total nominal government liabilities
in the near future does not exclude contraction far into the future. Furthermore, expansion of
the monetary base alone is simply substituting money for nominal bonds, as long as there are
still outstanding bonds. Only when all nominal government bonds have been bought by the
central bank does increasing the monetary base imply increasing total nominal liabilities. Since
the monetary base is normally a relatively small proportion of the total nominal liabilities, this
could take a long time. Even then, increasing total government liabilities in the present is hardly
a commitment not to reduce these in the future.
These issues point to an important role for ￿scal policy in escaping from a liquidity trap,
both with a ￿scal expansion and with regard to nominal debt management.74
6 Conclusions
In conclusion, let me restate the main points raised in this discussion of how monetary policy
should be conducted in an era of price stability. First, the conventional wisdom that price-level
targeting is inferior to in￿ation targeting seems ill-founded. Appropriately designed price-level
targeting may very well succeed in reducing long-term price-level uncertainty, stabilizing in￿ation
a n da v o i d i n gal i q u i d i t yt r a pb e t t e rt h a ni n ￿ a t i o nt a r g e t i n g . M o r er e s e a r c ha n de x p e r i e n c ei s
needed in order to judge whether or not this is generally the case and whether it is worthwhile
to eventually move on from ￿exible in￿ation targeting to ￿exible price-level targeting. Second,
￿exible forecast targeting, in the form of transparent forecast targeting with a symmetric and
74 Buiter and and Panigirtzoglou [22] point to the most unorthodox way of escaping from a liquidity trap. By
setting up a system to tax money, so-called Gesell money, a negative interest rate on money can be implemented,
so as to avoid the the zero interest rate bound and allow a lowering of the real interest rate. The administrative
di¢culties seem overwhelming, though.
34small positive in￿ation target, seems more e¢cient and realistic for maintaining price stability
than either a commitment to a simple instrument rule (like a Taylor rule) or monetary targeting.
This is, in particular, the case for distribution forecast targeting, since it can incorporate model
uncertainty and nonlinearities in a consistent way. Commitment to a simple instrument rule
seems both ine¢cient and unrealistic. Money-growth targeting would be ine¢cient. Counter
to conventional wisdom, this is not mainly due to the fact that money demand is subject to
shocks. Instead, this is due to the transmission mechanism not being recursive in the sense
that the monetary-policy instrument a⁄ects in￿ation and the output gap exclusively via money
growth. Monetary aggregates, for instance the real money gap, may still be important indicators
(among other indicators), with the optimal weight depending on their predictive power for future
in￿ation and the future output gap. Third, the bene￿ts of credibility of a monetary policy aimed
at price stability include an economy increasingly on automatic pilot, less need for monetary-
policy activism, an improved tradeo⁄ between in￿ation variability and output-gap variability,
and less risk of falling into a liquidity trap. Fourth, transparent in￿ation targeting seems to be
a good way of avoiding a liquidity trap, with the support of a contingency plan for emergency
monetary-policy and ￿scal-policy measures to be undertaken at prescribed indications of an
imminent liquidity trap (but only under those prescribed indications). These measures are also
likely to contribute to escaping from a liquidity trap if already trapped. Fiscal policy is likely
to have a special role in escaping from a liquidity trap.
35A In￿ation variability under in￿ation targeting and price-level targeting75
Suppose in￿ation targeting results in the AR(1) process for in￿ation
…t = h…t¡1 + ·t; (A.1)
where jhj < 1 and ·t is iid with E[·t]=0and Var[·t]=s 2 . The unconditional variance of
in￿ation under in￿ation targeting, denoted Var[…t]…, ful￿lls
Var […t]… =
s2
1 ¡ h2 : (A.2)
The price level, pt,i st h e ng i v e nb y
p t·p t ¡ 1+… t (A.3)
and has a unit root, so its unconditional variance is unbounded.
Suppose price-level targeting results in the AR(1) process for the price level
pt = kpt¡1 +·t;
where jkj < 1. The unconditional variance of the price level under price-level targeting, denoted
Var[pt]p ; is then
Var [pt]p =
s2
1 ¡ k2 :
The corresponding in￿ation process is
…t · pt ¡ pt¡1 = ¡(1 ¡ k)pt¡1 + ·t.
The unconditional variance of in￿ation under price-level targeting, Var[…t]p,i s




The di⁄erence between the unconditional variance of in￿ation under price-level targeting and
in￿ation targeting is










(1 ¡ h2)(1 + k)
s2:
Hence,
Var […t]p < Var […t]… if and only if k>1¡2 h 2: (A.5)
W es e et h a ti fh=k ,w eh a v eVar […t]p < Var […t]… if and only if h = k>1
2.
Fischer [40, ￿gure 2.4 and footnote 45] compares (A.2) and (A.4) with h =0and k =0 : 5 ,
for which case k<1¡2 h 2and Var[…t]p = 4
3s2 > Var […t]… = s2; the in￿ation variance is higher
under price-level targeting.
Duguay [31] examines the processes (A.1) and (A.3) for di⁄erent values of h and k.T y p i c a l
values used are h =0 : 5and 0:7 (in￿ation targeting such that 75% of the adjustment of in￿ation
towards the target is achieved in 2 and 4 periods (years), respectively), k =0 : 7(price-level
targeting where 75% of the adjustment of the price level towards the target is achieved in 4
periods (years)), and s2 =1(when … and p are measured in %/year and %, respectively, that
75 This follows the appendix of the working-paper version Svensson [106].
36is, scaled by 100). Let me use these values and compute the unconditional variance of in￿ation.
For these values, k>1 ¡ 2 h 2 , the variance is less under price-level targeting, and we get
Var[…t]… =1 : 33 and 1:95; respectively, and Var[…t]p =1 : 18. Now, the variance of in￿ation is
lower under price-level targeting.76
Table A.1 summarizes some results for the processes (A.1) and (A.3). As the above examples
show, the relative variance of in￿ation under in￿ation targeting and price-level targeting is not
obvious.
Table A.1
In￿ation targeting Price-level targeting
pt pt¡1 + …t kpt¡1 +·t
…t h…t¡1 + ·t ¡(1 ¡ k)pt¡1 + ·t
pT pt +
PT





¿=t+1 hT¡¿·¿ ¡(1 ¡ k)pT¡1 + ·T
Vart pT
h
(T ¡ t) ¡ 2 1¡hT ¡t






1 ¡ k2(T¡t)¢ s2
1¡k2
Vart …t+1 s2 s2
Vart …T
¡
1 ¡ h2(T¡t)¢ s2
1¡h2
£
(1 ¡ k)2 ¡
1 ¡ k2(T¡t¡1)¢
+1¡k 2⁄ s 2
1 ¡ k 2






B Monetary and ￿scal policy in a liquidity trap
In order to discuss the role of monetary and ￿scal policy in a liquidity trap, as a background to
section 5, I provide a simple example of a closed economy with a private sector and a government.
The government consists of a ￿scal authority and a central bank. The example is a simple
perfect-foresight version of a model in Woodford [130], where a more general treatment is given.
B.1 Private budget constraint




where – (0 <–<1 ) is a discount factor, U(ct;m t) is a well-behaved period utility function,
ct > 0 denotes consumption in period t, mt · Mt=Pt ‚ 0 is the end-of-period real monetary
base, Mt ‚ 0 denotes end-of-period holdings of base money, and Pt > 0 is the general price
level in period t. The private sector is consolidated to include banks, so the private sector￿s
net claims on the central bank consist of the monetary base. Including the real monetary base
in the period utility function is a convenient way of modelling a transactions demand for the
monetary base.
76 My notation di⁄ers from Duguay￿s. My h is his ﬂ,a n dm ykis his 1 ¡ ﬁ. Duguay does not report the
unconditional standard deviation of one-period in￿ation; instead he reports the conditional standard deviation of









T ¡t , for di⁄erent time horizons
T ¡ t.
37The private sector faces a sequence of budget constraints,
Ptct + Mt +
1
1+i t
B t=P ty t+M t ¡ 1+B t ¡ 1¡P t¿t; (B.2)
for t =1 , 2, ..., where Bt ‚ 0 are nominal government one￿period discount bonds bought in
period t that pay one nominal unit of account in period t+1,i t ‚0is the nominal (one-period)
interest rate, yt > 0 is output (considered exogenous), and ¿t real taxes levied on the private
sector. The initial holdings of money and bonds, M0 and B0 are given. The transversality
condition is speci￿ed below.77
De￿ne the government￿s nominal liabilities to the private sector in the beginning of period t,
At · Mt¡1 + Bt¡1 ‚ 0: (B.3)







A t +1 = Ptyt + At ¡ Pt¿t; (B.4)






where future nominal claims on the government are discounted by the nominal discount factor
1=
Q¿¡1
j=0(1+it+j). The opportunity cost of holding money is obviously i=(1+it). (I simplify by
considering only equality in the budget constraint and transversality condition).



















(Ptyt ¡ Pt¿t)+A 0
(where I use the convention
Q0
¿=1(1 + it+¿¡1) · 1).





where ƒt+1 · Pt+1=Pt denotes gross in￿ation in period t +1 . The sequence of private budget







a t +1 = yt + at ¡ ¿t; (B.7)






This can also be expressed as an intertemporal budget constraint on real form.
77 Real bonds can be introduced but are not essential for the argument.
38B.2 Government budget constraint
The sequence of consolidated government budget constraints for period t =1 ;2 ;:::; can be
written,




where gt (0 • gt <y t)is real government expenditure. In terms of (B.3), government nominal
liabilities, the budget constraints can be written
Ptgt + At =
1
1+i t
A t +1 +
it
1+i t
M t+P t¿t; (B.9)
with the nominal transversality condition (B.5). (Again, I simplify by considering the budget
constraint and transversality condition with equality only). The sequence of budget constraints















M t+P t¿t) :
Equivalently, the budget constraints (B.9) can be written on real form,
gt + at =
1
1+r t




with the real transversality condition (B.8).
Adding the private and government budget constraints, (B.2) and (B.9), we have
ct + gt = yt; (B.11)
the goods-market equilibrium condition, for t =1 ;2 ; :::
The government consists of a ￿scal authority and a monetary authority, the central bank.








t +P t¿t+P tz t; (B.12)
where B
g
t are nominal bonds issued by the ￿scal authority in period t and zt is real seignorage
received from the central bank.





t =M t¡M t ¡ 1+B c
t ¡ 1; (B.13)
where Bc
t is nominal bonds bought by the central bank in period t. Adding the ￿scal and





is the net nominal governments bonds issued.
Let us examine the central bank￿s budget constraints in more detail. Introduce the central














Assume now that the central bank each period delivers seignorage to the ￿scal authority, such
that its net nominal assets are always zero, Ac
t · 0. Then, we can write the central bank￿s
balance sheet at the beginning of period t, assets equal to liabilities, as
Bc
t = Mt; (B.15)









Thus, (B.3) and (B.9), together with the transversality condition (B.5), describe the essential
elements of the government budget constraint and monetary policy operations. We can think
of Mt, the monetary base, as the instrument (control variable) of the central bank, and two of
the tree variables gt, ¿t and Bt as the instruments of the ￿scal authority, leaving the remaining
variable to be determined by the consolidated budget constraint.78
In more detail, we can think of the central bank as setting Mt, thereby determining Bc
t
according to (B.15) and Ptzt according to (B.16), and the ￿scal authority as receiving seignorage
a n ds e t t i n gt w oo ft h et h r e ev a r i a b l e sg t ,¿ t ,a n dB
g
t, leaving the remaining variable to be
determined by the ￿scal authority￿s budget constraint, (B.12). The net issue of government
b o n d si st h e ng i v e nb y( B . 1 4 ) .
Let us de￿ne an equilibrium as a sequence fyt;c t;g t;¿t;M t¡1;B t¡1;P t;i tg 1
t=1, such that (i)
fct;M t;B tg 1
t=1 maximizes the private sector￿s utility function (B.1), subject to the sequence of
private budget constraints (B.2), the transversality condition (B.5), and given fyt;¿t;P t;i tg 1
t=1,
B0 and M0,a n d( i i )f y t ;c t;g tg 1
t=1, ful￿lls the goods-market equilibrium (B.11). Under (i) and
(ii), the sequence of government budget constraints (B.12) is also ful￿lled.
B.3 Zero interest rate





and by (B.16), seignorage is zero zt · 0: The nominal government budget constraint, (B.9), can
be written
At+1 = At + Pt(gt ¡ ¿t);
with the transversality condition
lim
¿!1At+¿ =0 : (B.18)
Equivalently, it can be written
1
1+r t
a t +1 = at + gt ¡ ¿t;
78 Woodford [130] discusses how we can alternatively consider the nominal interest rate as the central bank￿s
instrument.










=( 1+r t ¡ 1)(mt¡1 + bt¡1);
where bt · Bt=Pt and I have used (B.17), we can also write the government budget constraint
as
mt + bt =( 1+r t ¡ 1)(mt¡1 + bt¡1)+g t¡¿t:
B.4 Liquidity trap
Note that the ￿rst-order conditions for ct and mt, by (B.1) and (B.2), can be written
Um(ct;m t)





Solve this for mt, to get the money demand equation,
mt = f(ct;i t)
for it ‚ 0, where f(ct;i t)is increasing in ct and decreasing in it.
In particular, suppose there is a satiation level for real balances for it =0 , and de￿ne „ mt as
this satiation level, when ct ful￿lls the equilibrium condition (B.11),
„ mt · f(yt ¡ gt;0).
(Note that, if ct = yt ¡ gt increases over time, so will „ mt.)
De￿ne a liquidity trap as an equilibrium when the economy is satiated with real balances,
that is, when it · 0 and mt ful￿lls
mt ‚ „ mt
(this requires at+1=(1 + rt) ‚ „ mt).







Hence, when the transactions demand for real balance, „ mt, has been satiated, the private sector
is indi⁄erent between holding money and bonds. Since both assets pay the same real return
(seignorage, the opportunity cost of holding money is zero), the government￿s budget constraint
is independent of the distribution of nominal liabilities between bonds and money. That is, in a
liquidity trap, any level of real balances and bonds are an equilibrium, as long as they ful￿ll
„ mt • mt •
1
1+r t
a t +1;b t=
1
1+r t
a t +1 ¡ mt ‚ 0;
or
Pt „ mt • Mt • At+1;B t= A t +1 ¡ Mt ‚ 0:
This means that monetary policy is ine⁄ective. First, nominal interest rates cannot be
lowered further. Second, expansionary monetary policy, in the sense of increasing the real
monetary base, is ine⁄ective for escaping from the liquidity trap, at least as long as mt <a t +1.
Intuitively, since the economy is satiated with liquidity, increasing liquidity further has no e⁄ects.
41Open-market operations to increase real balances, mt, simply reduce the real value of outstanding
government bonds by the same amount, without any change in equilibrium.
Holding real balances constant means reducing Mt by the rate rt=(1 + rt).79 Expansionary
monetary policy, in the sense of reducing Mt at a lower rate, holding Mt constant, or increasing
Mt, has no e⁄ect, as long as the open-market operations reduce outstanding bonds to the same
extent.
Note, however, that Mt • At+1 and the transversality condition (B.18) imply that, in a
liquidity trap, we must have
lim
¿!1Mt+¿ =0 . (B.19)
This transversality condition is obviously violated, if Mt is held constant or increased inde￿nitely
over time. Intuitively, with a falling price level and sustained de￿ation, the real monetary
base and the real value of government nominal balances would then grow inde￿nitely, which
would violate the intertemporal budget constraint. Thus, holding Mt constant or increasing it
inde￿nitely is not consistent with a liquidity trap.
Indeed, even if the nominal monetary base were contracting so as to ful￿ll (B.19), it would
be enough to violate the intertemporal budget constraint if the nominal amount of government
bonds were held constant or increasing, so as to make total government nominal liabilities violate
the transversality condition (B.18). As clari￿ed by Woodford [130], regardless of the path of real
balances, any ￿scal policy holding nominal assets At+1 constant or increasing will violate the
transversality condition in a liquidity trap, and hence be inconsistent with the liquidity trap.
Thus, although a credible commitment to an inde￿nitely constant or increasing monetary
base is incompatible with a liquidity trap, a credible commitment to an inde￿nitely constant or
increasing level of government liabilities is equally incompatible with a liquidity trap. Hence,
either ￿scal or monetary policy can, in principle, get the economy out of the liquidity trap.
Note also, that a contractionary monetary policy, in the sense of reducing real balances below
„ mt, will, in a model with ￿exible prices and monetary neutrality, result in it > 0 and get the
economy out of the liquidity trap. However, in a model with sticky prices, sticky in￿ation, and
sticky in￿ation expectations, this increase in the interest rate may increase the real interest rate,
reduce output and consumption, that is, reduce yt ¡ gt and lower „ mt, which depending on the
dynamics of the economy, may lead to a worse situation.80
79 Note that mt+1 = mt implies Mt+1=Mt =ƒ t +1 =1 = (1 + rt)=1¡r t= (1 + rt).
80 See Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [22], Krugman [69] and Tetlow and Williams [116] for sticky-price models of
liquidity traps.
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